Welfare: theoretical and analytical paradigms by MacGregor, S
MacGregor, S (2014) Welfare: theoretical and analytical paradigms.
Technical Report. The United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD), Geneva.
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/2534567/
DOI:
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Copyright the author(s)
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 2014–13 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare: Theoretical and  
Analytical Paradigms 
Susanne MacGregor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prepared for the UNRISD project on 
Towards Universal Social Security in Emerging  
Economies: Process, Institutions and Actors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNRISD Working Papers are posted online  
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an autonomous 
research institute within the UN system that undertakes multidisciplinary research and policy 
analysis on the social dimensions of contemporary development issues. Through our work we 
aim to ensure that social equity, inclusion and justice are central to development thinking, policy 
and practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNRISD, Palais des Nations 
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland 
 
Tel: +41 (0)22 9173020 
Fax: +41 (0)22 9170650 
info@unrisd.org 
www.unrisd.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright  ©  United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
 
This is not a formal UNRISD publication. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed studies 
rests solely with their author(s), and availability on the UNRISD Web site (www.unrisd.org) does not 
constitute an endorsement by UNRISD of the opinions expressed in them. No publication or distribution 
of these papers is permitted without the prior authorization of the author(s), except for personal use. 
i 
 
 
Contents 
 
Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
Key Concepts .................................................................................................................... 1 
Context: From Welfare State to Neoliberalism ................................................................ 2 
Paradigms of Welfare and their Ideas  on Universalism and Targeting ........................... 3 
“Worlds of Welfare”: Profiles, Modifications  and Criticisms ........................................ 6 
Responding to Crisis: Ideas of Social Investment .......................................................... 11 
Current Trends ................................................................................................................ 17 
Relevance of These Issues for Emerging Economies ..................................................... 18 
Arguments for targeting.............................................................................................. 20 
Arguments against targeting ....................................................................................... 21 
Arguments for universalism ....................................................................................... 21 
Arguments against universalism ................................................................................. 22 
The Influence of Ideas, Interests and Institutions ........................................................... 23 
Issues and Challenges for Emerging Economies ............................................................ 26 
Policy Options ................................................................................................................ 28 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 31 
Appendix: Notes on Social Security Provision .............................................................. 33 
References ...................................................................................................................... 38 
 
ii 
 
Acronyms 
 
ALMP Active labour market programme 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CCT Conditional cash transfer 
CEE Central and Eastern European countries 
EITC Earned Income Tax Credit 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GNP Gross national product 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund  
ISSA International Social Security Association 
MI Minimum income 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OAP Old-age pensioner 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAYG Pay-as-you-go scheme 
RMI Revenu minimum d'insertion 
SSI Supplemental Security Income 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UN United Nations 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
US United States 
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
  
iii 
 
Abstract 
The paper reviews paradigms of welfare, principally the industrialization thesis, the 
three worlds of welfare and social investment states and shows how these link to wider 
public policies and underlying assumptions. It locates explanations in historical and 
contemporary contexts. The literature of social policy is seen to be both descriptive and 
prescriptive and to have developed in response to key crises. The paper considers 
arguments for and against universalism and targeting, and shows how these concepts fit 
within theories of welfare. It considers lessons from this review for discussions of how 
to develop social security and health systems in emerging economies and indicates the 
value of systems that include all or the vast majority of the population, organized 
around principles of collective social insurance and recognize the value of caring work. 
Proposals have, however, to be set in economic systems with fair, living wages and 
progressive income tax structures—goals which run counter to the current trajectory of 
financial capitalism. 
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Introduction 
This paper aims to set out a framework for the debate on how best to develop health and 
social security systems in future, looking at concepts of universalism and targeting and 
reviewing the main paradigms of welfare states. It discusses the assumptions, arguments 
and policy implications related to universalism and/or targeting. Key questions 
considered are:  
 
• What are the underlying assumptions related to universalism and targeting in these 
diverse paradigms? 
• What are the arguments for universalism or targeting in these paradigms?  
• What are the policy implications of these paradigms?  
• What issues should be considered by policy-makers in emerging economies aspiring 
to expand health and social security coverage in terms of population, the level of 
benefits, and scope? 
 
Principles of universal or selective/targeted social provision have long been central to 
discussions of the development of the welfare state (Anderson and Ytrehus 2012). While 
these concepts are often discussed as issues of social philosophy, it is important to 
understand why and how they have been promoted and implemented and with what 
effects: to do this, it is necessary to place these discussions in their historical and 
comparative context. First, however, we need to review the key concepts around which 
theories and analyses have revolved.  
Key Concepts 
 
Welfare was commonly used from the 14th Century to indicate happiness or 
prosperity. A subsidiary meaning was of merry-making. The extended sense of 
welfare as an object of organised care or provision came in in the 20th Century. 
The welfare state in distinction from the warfare state was first named in 1939 
(Williams 1985:281). 
 
A ‘welfare state’ is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through 
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at 
least three directions—first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum 
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by 
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet 
certain ‘social contingencies’ (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) 
which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all 
citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available 
in relation to a certain agreed range of social services (Briggs 1961: 288).  
 
Three policy domains are central to the welfare state—health care, pensions and labour 
market policy: “the lion’s share of social expenditure in all of the affluent democracies 
goes to two areas, health care and pensions” (Pierson 2001a:11). The welfare state “is 
generally taken to cover those aspects of government policy designed to protect against 
particular risks shared by broad segments of society” (Pierson 2011b:420). 
 
Richard Titmuss, seen by many as the founder of the discipline of social policy, pointed 
out that to equate the welfare state only with visible state provision is misleading, and he 
drew attention to the social division of welfare, noting three systems of welfare: social or 
public; fiscal; and occupational. The latter two tend to be regressive, favouring the middle 
class. Debates today still focus mainly on the most visible aspects of welfare. He also 
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warned against over-simplifying the distinction between universal and selective (or 
targeted) services. These have many forms, he observed, and selective services can play a 
role within a universalistic system (Smith and Titmuss 1987). He outlined three models 
of social policy: the residual welfare model; the industrial achievement-performance 
model; and the institutional redistributive model (Titmuss 1974). 
 
T.H. Marshall distinguished between universal programmes that guarantee a social 
minimum and those that strive to provide a social optimum (Marshall 1965:91–92). 
Targeting, by contrast, is when the scope of beneficiaries is more restrictive. More 
recently, Mkandawire noted that under universalism, the entire population is the 
beneficiary of social benefits as a basic right, while, under targeting, eligibility for social 
benefits involves some kind of means-testing to determine the “truly deserving”. 
However, he pointed out, policy regimes are hardly ever purely universal or purely based 
on targeting—most are hybrids (Mkandawire 2005). 
 
Universal services do not stigmatize: they are available and accessible without involving 
any loss of dignity or self-respect. They can be preventative if used by all the population 
and delivered through socially approved channels. A universalist system involves a 
comprehensive set of services, social security, education, personal social services, health 
care and housing. Some additional selective, specialist services may still be required to 
meet special needs or respond to the exclusion of some groups from services which 
ideally should be available to all (Anderson and Ytrehus 2012). 
Context: From Welfare State to Neoliberalism 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed major transformations of 
economic systems around the world. The first was the creation of capitalist markets 
in the Western hemisphere. The second was the transition from capitalism to 
socialism in several countries. The third was the transition in the reverse direction: 
from centrally planned, command systems back to market-based economies. The 
new globalization of business attached to an explosive expansion of information 
technologies (ITs) and the rapid IT-based industrialization of the Asian economies 
may constitute a fourth great transformation that will change the economic order of 
the globe (Kangas and Palme 2005:1). 
 
The historical development of the welfare state is one of both continuity and change. Path 
dependence is evident but major policy shifts have also occurred in response to crises. 
There was a general rise in public and social expenditure over time in advanced societies 
with benefits being written into law. The welfare state paradigm fitted with the age of 
incorporation in the mid-twentieth century—the so-called golden age of the 1950s and 
1960s. Following the inter-war Depression years and the Second World War, the post-war 
social settlement rested on a commitment to full employment, marrying Keynesian 
economic policy with social goals. Importantly, in this phase government in the mid-
twentieth century was viewed as competent and as representing the national interest 
(Sachs 2001:50). Welfare provision expanded due to desires for economic efficiency, 
social equality, social integration, stability, autonomy and/or to reduce poverty. These 
pressures emerged to different degrees in different countries at different times leading to 
different welfare configurations. 
 
The welfare state was challenged fundamentally in the late 1970s and 1980s (Mishra 
1984). The onset of “stagflation” meant that the resource base for social expenditure had 
ceased to grow. A key principle of revisionist post-war social democracy had been not to 
challenge inequality and class structures head on but to argue for equal opportunities in a 
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meritocratic society and to use the fruits of economic growth to finance public provision 
(Crosland 1956). This strategy was stopped in its tracks with the oil and fiscal crises of 
the 1970s. Right-wing ideas gained ground.1 But criticisms of the post-war social 
settlement had come from the Left as well as from the Right, with feminist critiques 
being among the most important.  
 
Change in all regimes occurred from 1975 (Taylor-Gooby 2001). Underlying forces 
accounting for change were the move to post-industrial economies, characterized by 
changes in the labour market and especially in women’s employment. The 1997 East 
Asia financial crisis and the increasing role played by giant transnational companies also 
featured. Attention to the role of post-industrialization gave way to attention to the 
phenomenon of globalization in explaining changes.2 But “one dimension of 
globalisation has been crucial: a wave of deregulatory pressures emanating from changes 
in the US political economy, which have led to a dramatic erosion of forms of protected 
employment” (Pierson 2001a:3). Globalization set welfare states in competition with each 
other. This raised the question whether socially just policies could co-exist with the 
pursuit of economic competitiveness. In this period of rethinking social policy, new 
players entered into the discussions. International organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and UN agencies 
such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) became involved in prescribing country policy, along with regional organizations 
and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This generated a global 
discourse about the best kind of social policy. And crucially in this period of dominant 
financial capitalism, a global private market in social provision has been created with the 
possibility of mainly US and European private health care and hospital providers, 
education providers, social care agencies and social insurance companies benefiting from 
an international middle-class market (Deacon 2003:14). This process has been actively 
encouraged through the promotion of international trade agreements such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and TTIP (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is a 
proposed free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States), 
which make it more difficult for governments to regulate markets for public benefit.  
 
However, so far neoliberal rationalities have reshaped rather than dismantled the welfare 
state (Hartman 2005), mainly due to opposition from social forces representing different 
interests and values. There was a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice (Mahon 
et al. 2012). However the pressure continues and has (perhaps surprisingly) withstood the 
economic crisis of 2008. Neoliberal policies involve a shift from entitlement to obligation 
and the rise of precarious employment. In neoliberal systems, welfare has a distinct 
function: it allows precarious employment to flourish through an increase in income 
support for the low-waged and poor. Targeted social assistance underwrites the flexible 
labour market and helps to manage peripheral populations. The welfare poor serve as 
scapegoats, helping to discipline those just above them in the hierarchy (Hartman 2005; 
Piven and Cloward 1971). 
Paradigms of Welfare and their Ideas  
on Universalism and Targeting  
With the industrialisation thesis, there is said to be a necessary link between 
urbanization, industrialization and the growth of welfare states (Sachs 2011). The thesis 
rests on analysis of the growth of social expenditure over time. Broad overviews 
                                                 
1  Friedman 1980; Harris and Seldon 1987; Hayek 1976; Murray 1984. 
2  George 1998; Brady et al., 2005; Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005. 
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highlight shared features across countries at similar stages of development. Industrial 
societies develop from the “night watchman” state to a “social service” state, and then to 
the “welfare state”. Social history is a process of progressive development, inevitable 
improvement, and the increasing power of rationality in deciding on human affairs. 
 
Linked to the industrialization thesis are ideas of convergence, that is, that over time 
societies will become more similar as they industrialize: as countries enter the advanced 
stages of industrialization, they become increasingly comparable in their major 
institutional arrangements and in their social systems generally. The combination of 
modern technology and an advanced economy produces standardization across societies, 
with welfare a functional prerequisite. Governments are supposedly neutral, with policy 
best formulated by technical experts.  
 
Wilensky, a leading exponent of this view, argued that this was not simply a reflection of 
prosperity but was crucially influenced by interest-group formation: “the root cause of the 
general level of expenditure is economic growth. Affluence has produced a large proportion 
of old people—at once a population in need and a political force for further social security 
development” (Wilensky 1976:13). Two elements were at work: demographic change and 
the political power of older people. For these interests to be represented, there had to be a 
certain kind of political system, principally electoral democracy.  
 
Industrialization leads to an increased proportion of older people in the population as an 
outcome of a decline in the birth rate together with a decline in mortality. So a key 
explanation for social security growth is the age composition of the population. For 
Wilensky, writing before the era of retrenchment, a key explanatory variable lay in the 
age of the social security system itself: he concluded that all systems mature and all 
government budgets are incremental. Industrial societies are characterized by a general 
trend from the residual to the institutional form of welfare he argued (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux 1958). 
 
In this paradigm, there is a gradual development from selective targeting to universalism: 
the provision of universal social security is rational, functional, affordable, desirable and 
implementable through a neutral and trusted state.  
 
These accounts include ideas about the impact of modernization, increasing urbanization 
and changes in family structures, an increase in the proportion of the population employed 
in non-primary industry, an increase in population, increase in the size of GNP, 
establishment of mass democracy, and institutionalization of state intervention.  
 
Marxist theories also focused on the development of industrial societies but emphasized 
the point that these were capitalist societies where the connection between social security 
and the wage system was critical (Gough 1979). Increasing state expenditure is functional 
but in the sense of meeting the interests of capital. O’Connor, for example, distinguished 
three types of state expenditure: social investment, which leads to increased productivity 
and thus profit; social consumption, which lowers the reproduction costs of labour thus 
leading to increased profit; and social expenses, required to produce social harmony. 
Social security expenditures are thus functional for capitalist societies in ensuring the 
adequate reproduction of labour power, giving collective provision against insecurity, 
providing for the casualties of the system, enabling national efficiency, improving the 
quality of labour and responding to the increasing complexity of modern life (O’Connor 
1979). Marxist accounts note two basic objectives of the capitalist state—accumulation 
and legitimation. In conditions of austerity, these objectives became increasingly 
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contradictory (Offe 1984). Legitimation crises and fiscal crises mark the trajectories of 
capitalist states (Habermas 1976; Lichten 1986). For these writers, at best the welfare 
state produces a tolerable rather than a ruthless capitalism. The welfare state serves as a 
palliative or shock absorber but underlying structures remain the same. Ginsburg also 
noted the role of social policies in structuring patriarchal and racial capitalist societies 
(Ginsburg 1992).  
 
In this perspective, the move from residual to universal social security reflects the 
increased need for capital to control and exploit more intensively increasing proportions 
of the population, the majority of whom are employed workers. Yet these expenditures 
challenge the profitability of capital, prompting frequent clashes of class politics and cut-
backs.  
 
A related but distinct paradigm sees welfare as the achievement of social rights. Welfare 
is one aspect of a package of rights, attained through democratic movements and social 
progress (Marshall 1965). Here, the first phase involved the attainment of civil rights 
through legal reforms; the second, the attainment of political rights for the majority 
through universal suffrage movements; and the third, the attainment of social rights with 
reforms establishing the welfare state.  
 
Richard Titmuss saw the forces leading to the welfare state as being mainly the fear of 
social revolution, the need for a law-abiding labour force, the social conscience of the rich 
and the role of political parties and pressure groups competing for power. However, he 
thought the most important force was the working class ethic of solidarity and mutual aid.  
 
Universal welfare is here seen principally as an achievement of social democratic parties. 
Korpi argued that the extension of social citizenship through modern social policies was a 
fundamental macro-level social change in the twentieth century (Korpi 1989). In 
particular, he drew attention to the role of Left government participation in the extension 
of social rights. By contrast, Rimlinger argued that the key difference between countries 
with regard to the development of social security was the strength and content of the 
liberal tradition (Rimlinger 1971). For Castles, equally important was the extent to which 
Right-wing parties opposed or conceded to reform. In certain conditions (war or 
dominance of progressive business within the elite), opposition from the Right may be 
lifted or diverted, allowing universalist ideas to make progress (Castles 1989).  
 
All these writers highlighted the role of political battles in the development of social 
security. Universal social security has been a political goal of social democratic parties 
and trade unions because it meets shared needs and serves the interests of the mass of 
working people. Universal provision develops not primarily to alleviate poverty but to 
provide security for the majority. Working class aversion to targeting reflected the 
historical experience of the workhouse and of means testing where working class pride 
was offended by targeting provision through charity and poor relief. Universalism 
supports the dignity of labour.  
For the American writers Fran Piven and Richard Cloward, however, social welfare 
systems were better explained as a device to enforce social discipline and regulate the 
poor: welfare was not so much about meeting need as about maintaining the rule of elites 
(Piven and Cloward 1971). Importantly, they concluded that welfare systems focus on the 
poor, not the majority. Social change results from a dynamic of repression and resistance: 
in this, community groups are as (or more) important than organized labour. Welfare’s 
default position is residual and targeted, minimal provision. Expenditure expands only as 
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a response to protest and riot and, once social control has been re-established, provision is 
withdrawn and falls back to the lowest level possible.  
 
Foucauldian accounts have also argued that welfare systems act to police the population, 
acting as inspector and scrutinizer, monitoring subjects, especially through collecting 
vital information on social groups, (taken a step further recently by processes of 
digitization). Here universal institutions are part of a process supporting the 
internalization of self-regulation among the majority, with punitive, targeted measures 
reserved for the minority of poor and deviant who are unable or unwilling to discipline 
themselves (Rose 1999).  
 
Other studies have explained the development of social protection as part of nation-
building with preparations for war and the experience of war often serving as catalysts for 
change (Middlemas 1979). War-time has also been seen as an important crisis leading to 
increases in public expenditure, which never return to the pre-war level (Peacock and 
Wiseman 1961). War and other critical periods also increase state capacity. Universal 
policies in Europe developed in the context of mid-twentieth century state of total war 
when mass mobilization was required. Social protection served as compensation for 
sacrifice and helped to manage a mass population.  
 
War has influenced the development of social protection through the process of testing 
social institutions. Institutions may withstand the test of crises or may collapse or change. 
Austerity and fiscal crisis may operate similarly to test institutions (Schmidt and Hersh 
2003). 
 
All the above theories tend to draw on historical evidence from one or two countries, or 
on cross-national studies focusing solely on levels of social expenditure measured as a 
proportion of GNP. Comparative social policy developed further with advanced 
computing which allowed more complex comparisons. But analyses were also shaped 
dramatically by Esping-Andersen’s formulation of the “three worlds of welfare” (Esping-
Anderson 1990).  
“Worlds of Welfare”: Profiles, Modifications  
and Criticisms  
Importantly, Esping-Andersen characterized his object of study as capitalist societies 
rather than seeing them as primarily industrial, urban or modern.3 
 
The three worlds of welfare profile different regime types and derive from a review of 18 
countries: regime refers to a framework of rules and understandings, codes and sanctions 
within which policies operate. The emphasis in regime theories is on the clustering of 
factors which together explain differences and similarities. These regimes are ideal types 
in the Weberian sense, serving as heuristic devices not as fixed types or categories. Real 
world complexity is recognized by Esping-Andersen. 4 
                                                 
3  Three ideal types of industrial capitalism have been profiled (Schmidt and Hersh 2003): the market-led type; state-led 
capitalism; and negotiated or consensual capitalism. In the market-led type, dominant players are private actors and 
key values promote individualism and liberalism (p.6). The role of the state with regard to social protection is one of 
minimal allocations to low-income groups and private insurance is mainly employment-based (p. 7). In state-led 
capitalism, public agencies collaborate with private enterprise. Central planning is significant, and some workers are 
tied to private corporations through enterprise-based welfare benefits: however, employment conditions in family and 
medium-sized factories are more precarious (p. 7). Negotiated or consensual capitalism involves workers’ rights and 
social welfare (p. 8). 
4  “The Scandinavian countries may be predominantly social democratic but they are not free of crucial liberal 
elements...At least in its early formulation, the New Deal (in USA) was as social democratic as was contemporary 
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In the three worlds of welfare, Esping-Andersen distinguishes between liberal, 
conservative (or corporatist) and social democratic forms of welfare capitalism. The 
pivotal questions concern relations between state, market and family. For Esping-
Andersen, key distinguishing features are the degree of decommodification, patterns of 
social stratification and patterns of employment. Social rights are considered in terms of 
their capacity for decommodification: a social right is something which permits people to 
make their living standards independent of pure market forces. Politics matters in this 
account but politics is not only about the political mobilization of the working classes: 
other influences such as nation building and the influence of Catholicism or conservatism 
are also included.  
 
In the social democratic model, crucially, the goal is equality of the highest standard 
rather than an equality of minimum needs. The principles of universalism and 
decommodification extend also to the new middle class. Social democracy is the key 
force behind social reform. The goal is equality of the highest standard rather than an 
equality of minimum needs. The state takes direct responsibility for caring for children, 
the aged and the helpless. The system rests on a strategy of full employment. The welfare 
state is not just a provider but also an employer, especially of women, with the costs of 
the family being socialized and the vast majority of women being in paid public service 
employment.  
 
This regime type is found mainly in the Scandinavian countries, which display a high 
level of prosperity and rapid economic growth, despite their high social spending.  
 
Liberal welfare states, by contrast, only grudgingly provide the minimum welfare 
necessary for a healthy economy. The bottom line is that efficiency must not be 
undermined by social policy. Social insurance is self-financed with no major 
redistribution of income and only modest social transfers. Much stress is placed on 
reinforcing the work ethic, with means-tested welfare assistance stigmatized (“welfare” 
here being used in the American sense). However some private welfare is subsidized by 
the state. Liberal welfare regimes give more weight to economic efficiency goals and 
often argue there is a tension between equity and efficiency.  
 
Conservative regimes are strongly corporatist with emphasis on the preservation of status 
differentials. Rights are attached to class or status, and there is little redistribution. The 
church is influential but private insurance and occupational benefits play only a marginal 
role. Preservation of the traditional family is important, with family benefits encouraging 
motherhood. As practised in Germany and within the European Union, a key organizing 
principle is that of subsidiarity. 
 
It is the history of political class coalitions which has given rise to these different shapes 
of welfare; for Esping-Andersen, this is the most decisive cause of welfare state variation. 
Most comparative analyses of these three welfare regimes have focused on social security 
defined in terms of unemployment benefits, pensions and/or social assistance. Health 
insurance has not always been included. Bambra has, however, constructed a health 
decommodification index, looking at the same 18 countries of the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the same point in time as did 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scandinavian social democracy. And European conservative regimes have incorporated both liberal and social 
democratic impulses”’ (Esping-Anderson 1990:28–29). 
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Esping-Andersen.5 On the whole, the three worlds of welfare stood up to scrutiny 
(Bambra 2006). 
 
The concept of three worlds of welfare became the main reference point in comparative 
social policy studies thereafter and generated a huge literature, including some criticisms 
and revisions. 
 
One set of criticisms extended the list of types (Arts and Gelisson 2002). Commentators 
argued that Mediterranean countries constitute a separate regime with limited social 
insurance coverage, which is (at least partially) rooted in clientelism (Leibfried and 
Pierson 1995). These Southern European cases, also described as the Latin Rim, were 
initially rudimentary welfare states with no given right to welfare and resting on older 
traditions connected to the Catholic Church. However they moved rapidly towards 
welfare state provision influenced by European Union (EU) membership.6 
 
East Asian welfare states have been seen as a separate regime. Asian countries generally 
introduced social security programmes when they entered the global economy in the 
1970s, and welfare expansion accompanied rapid and strong economic growth. Regional 
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank proposed social protection plans. 
Social development as well as economic development was promoted (Chan 2004). In 
“productivist welfare capitalism”, social policy was subordinated to economic policy and 
the imperatives of growth, premised on full employment, and supported in some 
countries by broader policies of land reform and public housing. In this model, social 
expenditures are relatively small but are well targeted on basic education and health as 
part of a strategy of nation-building, legitimation and productive investment. 
 
Using the concept “family of nations”, Castles identified the Antipodean countries as 
radical welfare states. Australia in particular has been said to be in a different category of 
“social protection by other means” or an employment-focused regime (Castles and 
Mitchell 1993). Welfare here is linked to national level collective bargaining between 
employers and trade unions but without as much state involvement as in the social 
democratic nations. 
 
A further regime type suggested is that of post-Communist countries. These were 
countries where, under Soviet Communism, authoritarian dictatorships stressed industrial 
output and social policy was work-centred. Failed economic policies and high military 
expenditures led to declining standards of living in the late 1970s and 1980s and 
eventually to social revolutions. Social policy under Communism had involved central 
regulation of wages and a social wage with high female labour force participation. Public 
services, especially health and education, grew, and there were rights to housing but this 
was often of poor quality. Child care services expanded. In these systems, there was full 
and quasi-obligatory employment, broad and universalistic social insurance, and a highly 
developed, often company-based, system of services and fringe benefits. Transition saw 
variations between countries with a move to a more liberal model in some countries, in 
                                                 
5  This index measured private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP and counted private hospital beds as a 
percentage of the total bed stock and also looked at the percentage of the population covered by the public health care 
system. Bambra then compared her classification of countries, using this health care index, with the more conventional 
labour market-centred welfare state typologies and found that Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden stayed in the 
high decommodification group. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
stayed in the conservative medium group, with Australia and the United States staying in the liberal or low 
commodification group. However there were some differences, with changes to the classification of Canada, Ireland, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
6  It is these countries however which currently bear the brunt of austerity policies following the 2008 financial crisis, with 
very high rates of youth unemployment, which raises questions about how long these systems can survive. 
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others to a welfare state, and in others a return to older forms (Cook 2014; Deacon et al. 
1992). 
 
The “worlds of welfare” discussions have been criticized by those who point to the 
neglect of ethnic divisions and differentiations (Williams 1989). Migrant workers, for 
example, perform much of the low-paid service sector work in many affluent countries. 
Migration has increased the extent of heterogeneity and differentiation within many 
countries, and some see diversity as posing a challenge to universalistic welfare states 
(Goodhart 2013). Migrants are often excluded from social security systems founded on 
notions of citizenship or residence tests. They do however often provide essential labour 
in systems of health and social care and in the private domestic sphere.  
 
Korpi and Palme criticized Esping Andersen’s paradigm saying “it mixes causes, 
mediating variables and outcomes” (Korpi and Palme 2003:431). They noted important 
differences between kinds of risks. Ageing and sickness are risks universally shared. But 
risks for unemployment, accidents and poverty are skewed. Korpi and Palme offer a 
different typology based on variables such as criteria for benefit eligibility, principles for 
benefit levels, and forms of programme governance. They discern five types. 
 
• The targeted model—which provides minimum benefits after a test of need 
(Australia).  
• A voluntary state–supported model which is organized through a number of voluntary 
funds, and eligibility depends on membership contribution but benefits are relatively 
low.  
• A Bismarckian state corporatist model where membership is given to the 
economically active population; there are occupational, segmented insurance 
organizations; and benefits are related to previous earnings—contributions and 
financing systems vary but the state corporatist system crucially involves joint 
governance by representatives of employers and employees (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Japan). These systems also often include important roles 
for confessional parties which stress social cohesion.  
• The Beveridgean basic security model which is universalistic in that it includes all 
those insured in the same programme and offers flat rate benefits at relatively low 
levels (Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States).  
• The encompassing model which combines aspects of the Beveridgean and 
Bismarckian systems, combining earning-relatedness with universalism, giving basic 
security to all citizens as well as earnings related benefits to the economically active 
(Finland, Norway and Sweden).  
 
These encompassing arrangements bring in the middle classes but need political parties to 
organize. They provide high benefit levels and insurance coverage in periods of 
expansion: in retrenchment, given their reliance on political parties, outcomes are 
affected by the ideology and practice of those parties.7 
 
Feminists criticized Esping-Andersen’s regime typology for being limited to the work–
welfare nexus and ignoring the care-welfare nexus (Lewis 1992; O'Connor et al. 1999). 
Pascall and Lewis (2004) argue that within Europe, women’s labour market participation 
in the West and the collapse of communism in the East undermined the systems and 
                                                 
7  Around the turn of the 21st century the European labour movement abandoned support for decommodifying welfare 
policies and moved support towards work oriented measures to enable participation in the market, influenced by the 
US 1996 welfare reforms (Gilbert and Besharov 2011). 
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assumptions of both the Western male breadwinner model and the dual worker model of 
central and eastern Europe. Care work and unpaid care workers have been the principal 
casualties of recent trends (Abramovitz and Zelnick 2010). In all regimes, policies for 
supporting unpaid care work have developed modestly compared with labour market 
activation. Where Esping-Andersen focused on decommodification, social stratification 
and employment, for feminists, the key elements of gender regimes are paid work, care 
work, income, time and voice (Pascall and Lewis 2004). 
 
The liberal model, represented by the United States and to some extent the United 
Kingdom, offers women as individuals the right to gender equality at work but accepts 
only limited public responsibility for the costs of children and brings “problems of 
income and time poverty, gender inequality, questionable child care arrangements, and 
poor outcomes for children” (Pascall and Lewis 2004:377–378). In the liberal United 
States, women’s full-time work is supported mainly by privatized care, with many 
consequences for time and the quality of care, as well as deep social divisions in work, 
with better-off women relying on the labour of poor, often migrant, women. Only the 
social democratic, Scandinavian regimes approach gender equality across paid work, care 
work, income, time and voice (Pascall and Lewis 2004:379). Here, Scandinavian 
women’s full-time work—or long part-time hours—are combined with social care 
provided outside the family. The consequence is however occupational segregation.8 
However, gender pay gaps are low and there is greater equality of work within 
households.  
 
The gender division of unpaid work is fundamental but overlooked in both the 
industrialization and three worlds of welfare accounts. Feminists point to the significance 
of collective provision as evidenced by those regimes that have actually produced a 
degree of gender equality, especially Scandinavian and Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries (Pascall and Lewis 2004). 
 
Feminist accounts thus focus on the central dimensions of gendered divisions of labour, 
the family wage system, traditional marriage and controls over women’s bodies. They 
pay particular attention to women’s labour market participation, employment rights, 
service provision, parental leave policies and employment equality strategies, as well as 
old age retirement and survivors’ coverage, unemployment benefits, sole parents’ 
benefits, support for families and support for care-giving.  
 
With regard to universalism and targeting, feminists criticize concepts of universalism as 
being “male universalism” only, since most systems give lower priority to women’s 
interests and needs (other than as mothers).9 Insurance systems, especially those which 
are earnings-related, based on contributions and standard employment careers, do not fit 
with the interrupted, low-paid, working lives of women and their dual and triple burdens 
are not recognized. Targeted systems are even worse, focusing on poor mothers and 
involving submission to demeaning and punitive procedures before benefits can be 
accessed. These explanations indicate that there are various kinds of universalism, more 
or less inclusive, and with more or less redistribution. The different systems attract more 
or less support and are more or less sustainable. Korpi and Palme clearly prove that a 
narrowly targeted transfer payment to the poorest, which might be adequate initially for 
                                                 
8  Within households there may be an alliance of private and public (one partner working in the private sector and the 
other in the public). This may encourage support for public provision as couples recognize their joint interests are 
served by public services. 
9  Skocpol demonstrated the pivotal role of women’s voluntary organization in the early formation of America’s 
“maternalist welfare state” (Skocpol 1992). 
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effectively fighting poverty, leads to a loss of political support. This is the paradox of 
redistribution. In the end, the most targeted benefit systems are least likely to redistribute 
income (Korpi and Palme 1998). 
 
Disruption and crisis led to adaptations and revisions of the key components of these 
worlds of welfare. Cox observed that two decades of reform from the 1970s through the 
1990s changed the face of the welfare state: “the principle of universal entitlement 
derived from citizenship is giving way to a less formal, more discursive notion of social 
entitlement” (Cox 1998:3). There was a general move away from optimal provision 
towards minimalist provision. Obligations as well as rights were emphasized. Cox 
criticized Esping-Andersen’s concept of the three worlds of welfare as being “flawed on 
empirical grounds” (Cox 1998:13). In addition “two decades of reform have 
fundamentally changed this profile in many countries” (Cox 1998:14). Selectivity, he 
observed, is now the norm.  
 
Pierson, however, concluded that direct attacks on social programmes were generally of 
limited success. Social expenditure roughly maintained its share of economic output in 
both America and Britain: that is, the main components of the welfare state remained 
intact, despite the political onslaught associated with Reagan and Thatcher. But the 
impact on the distribution of income was great. This “new politics of social policy” 
perspective concluded that in an era of austerity, the class-based parties which had driven 
welfare state expansion had been superseded by powerful new interest groups of welfare 
state clients (such as middle class parents or older people)—these were often able to 
resist the retrenchment pressures of post industrialism (Pierson 2001). (Similarly the 
experience of receiving care or support varied, with demeaning conditions attached to 
receipt of public benefits by the poor, and (sometimes but not always) more favourable 
treatment experienced in the more costly private sector).  
 
Korpi and Palme discern a “cyclical pattern in the relative significance accorded to class 
in debates within social science” (Korpi and Palme 2003:425). These authors see the 
continuing significance of power resources and socioeconomic class, with class being 
defined in terms of position in the labour market. The level of unemployment is crucial 
and the return of mass unemployment poses challenges to welfare states.  
 
Research working within this perspective consistently demonstrates that conservative 
welfare states have generous pension schemes with high replacement rates but low 
redistribution. Redistribution is higher in the Nordic and Continental and lower in the 
Southern and Anglo-Saxon types within Europe (Kammer et al. 2012). The explanation 
lies with which groups are included in social security systems, and this reflects the 
underlying political coalitions and the governance of welfare programmes. Korpi and 
Palme in a much cited article had clearly proved that a narrowly targeted transfer 
payment to the poorest, which might be adequate for effectively fighting poverty, leads to 
a loss of political support. This is the paradox of redistribution. In the end, the most 
targeted benefit systems are least likely to redistribute income (Korpi and Palme 1998).  
Responding to Crisis: Ideas of Social Investment  
In the context of late twentieth century social and economic changes, the OECD played a 
key role in developing a supply-side strategy towards unemployment (Triantafillou 
2011). The new approach was that interventions should seek to stimulate the self-
governing capacities of the unemployed, entrepreneurs, students and others. The 
assumption was that globalization, new forms of information and communication 
UNRISD Working Paper 2014–13 
 
12 
 
technology, new social movements and interest groups, new identities and cultures, the 
hollowing out of the state and the increased strength of organized private interest groups 
had produced a complex society to which the old forms of the welfare state were badly 
matched. New forms of policy delivery were required, along with structural changes in 
the labour market.  
 
A related assumption was of the need to modernize to address new issues. This included a 
modernized form of the state in which the state has a positive role, acting in partnership 
with the market. These ideas were supported by the European Commission and promoted 
by agencies like OECD, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World 
Bank, indicating the influence of epistemic communities of experts and advisers such as 
the International Social Security Association (ISSA).10 
 
The OECD and the World Bank are associated with the diffusion of the ideas and 
practices that underpin neoliberal globalization. But both have gone beyond brute 
neoliberal prescriptions of welfare cuts and structural adjustment to advocate public 
investment in child care and child development programmes—investing in children as 
part of a social investment strategy (Mahon 2010). However, while there is some 
convergence at the level of discourse regarding the need to invest in child care, there is 
continued diversity in actual policies. The World Bank also promoted privatization of 
health services, user fees and encouraging NGOs to provide services along with 
decentralization (Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010).  
 
In this paradigm, labour markets should be reformed to allow marginal workers to find 
jobs more easily (even if these jobs are low paid and insecure). Maintaining the incentive 
to work is the crucial issue. Thus reforms to social security were thought to be required. 
The view emerged that the “functioning of markets depends fundamentally on a wide 
array of domestic institutions, such as inter-firm relations, taxation regimes, employment 
relations, infrastructure, education systems and an effective bureaucracy” (Triantafillou 
2011:575). Enabling institutions were thought to be needed, which should encourage 
innovation, new technologies and entrepreneurs, create active citizens who are 
employable, and encourage the unemployed to engage actively in job search. Policies 
should be comprehensive. 
 
The social investment perspective arose as a response to the experience of the 
consequences of neoliberalism. It represented an updated social compromise—a middle 
way between the neoliberal model and the universalist welfare state—and, crucially, was 
seen as realistic and politically feasible. Its main goals were to redirect social policy away 
from what was seen as a bias in both universalist and targeted systems in favour of 
passive income maintenance towards active labour market programmes (ALMPs) which 
it was argued could put people back to work: trampolines, not safety nets, were the 
ambition. Responding to feminist critiques, the aim was also to help households 
harmonize work and family life (Esping-Andersen 1996a:3). A new form of skills 
                                                 
10 For example, the concept of dynamic social security has been fostered by the ISSA which sees itself as an international 
agent for change, promoting and developing social security throughout the world, primarily through its technical and 
administrative improvement, in order to advance the social and economic conditions of the population on the basis of 
social justice (ISSA 2011a). The association has over 350 member organizations in over 150 countries, and the 
majority of these members are national institutions directly responsible for the administration of one or more aspects of 
social security. The ISSA defines social security as “any programme of social protection established by legislation, or 
any other mandatory arrangement, that provides individuals with a degree of  income security when faced with the 
contingencies of old age,  survivorship, incapacity, disability, unemployment or rearing children.  It may also offer 
access to curative or preventive medical care. As  defined by the International Social Security Association, 
social  security can include social insurance programmes, social assistance  programmes, universal programmes, 
mutual benefit schemes, national  provident funds, and other arrangements including market-oriented  approaches 
that, in accordance with national law or practice, form part  of a country's social security system.” 
https://www.issa.int/topics/understanding/introduction.  
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training was proposed for the post-industrial economies with an emphasis on human 
capital investment. The idea of activation became a leading theme across a number of 
countries in the 1990s and 2000s, coloured differently however when taken up in 
different settings—either liberal, social democratic or corporatist. 
 
Activation policies to promote the employment of lone parents have been prominent in 
recent years (Knijn et al. 2007). Provision for widows shifted to a concern with never 
married, divorced or separated women in the 1980s, partly due to an increase in numbers 
in these categories and numbers claiming assistance. Activation policies would “make 
work pay” through subsidizing employers as well as employees (Kuttner 2002).  
 
ALMPs aim to raise the cost of non-work, increase the benefits of work, increase the 
availability of work and increase readiness to work. Møller and Stone comment that 
ALMPs involve a shift to a moral perspective on social welfare: there has been, they 
observe, a strong re-emergence of a moral framework for governing the relationship 
between labour markets and social assistance (Møller and Stone 2012).  
 
In some ways, the social investment perspective can be seen as a variant of the 
industrialization thesis, in that it downplays capitalist relations and highlights changes in 
employment. For the affluent, advanced industrial societies, the idea gained ground that 
in competition with the emerging economies (the BRICS, or Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa), it was unrealistic to aim to compete in terms of wage levels: rather the 
state should encourage the development of upmarket knowledge and skills (Morel et al. 
2012). 
 
“Starting in the late 1990s, new ideas concerning the role and shape of social policy and 
its role in relation to the economy began to emerge” (Morel et al. 2012a:8). Welfare state 
principles, goals and instruments were redefined and revised to adapt to the new 
socioeconomic context (Esping-Anderson 1996; Giddens 2000). Various terms appeared 
to profile these revised social policies—the developmental welfare state, the social 
investment state, the enabling state and inclusive liberalism—but in all of them social 
investment was the key theme. A core idea was that of the knowledge-based economy. 
Knowledge was to be the driver of productivity and growth, assuming low-skilled jobs 
would migrate elsewhere. Post-industrial societies, it was argued, had to compete by 
developing and trading in high quality, high-skilled manufacturing, as in Germany, or 
service jobs, finance or health care. This became a key part of European Union strategy, 
encapsulated in the Lisbon agenda, adopted in 2000. 
 
For social security, the need was to modernize to better address new social risks and 
needs. Prominent among these were single parenthood, balancing work and family life, 
and encouraging flexibility and adaptation through training and lifelong learning. What 
appeared to some to be an oxymoron emerged in the concept of “flexible security”. Along 
with this, it was recognized that a new social problem, termed social exclusion, had 
emerged and policies to promote social inclusion were developed. Investment in human 
capital—especially through education and training—was implemented in different ways 
in different countries and to varying extents: done poorly in the United Kingdom and 
better in Germany and Sweden, for example.  
 
Rather than social expenditure being seen as a burden or a cost, as the liberal and 
neoliberal perspective would have it, this paradigm assumes that social policy can be a 
positive factor in economic development. Continuities with the industrialization thesis are 
evident, with social security being seen as a necessary aspect of development—as 
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functional and rational—and as linking to national or regional strategies and interests. 
East Asian productivist systems as in Singapore seemed to exemplify this with their 
commitment to education, health and social services (Gough 2000). 11  
 
The state is thus not merely the agent of capital but has an important role to play in 
furthering the national interest, as distinct from the general interests of capital. The older 
methods of central planning and regulation are thought no longer relevant or applicable in 
an era of financial capitalism: ways have to be found to attract foreign investment and 
promote national companies. This might involve a reduction in corporation taxes 
(encouraging low tax regimes and the migration of companies’ headquarters) and 
promotion of a favourable environment for business to operate in, which could include 
providing a skilled, educated, healthy and disciplined workforce, along with supportive 
infrastructure and law and order. This has important implications for taxation with the tax 
burden increasingly shifting away from business (especially multinationals who find 
ways to avoid payments) and falling more on consumers, with a parallel shift from more 
progressive income taxes to regressive indirect taxes. Thus while social expenditure 
remains a key aspect of government policy, its finance is raised increasingly unequally 
from taxes on residents. 
 
Those arguing for the social investment paradigm trace its origins to inter-war Sweden 
and the work of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal (Morel et al. 2012). At that time, in the 1930s, 
a specific link was made to population policies and the fertility question: the policies that 
followed were notable for their focus on children and recognition of the need to provide 
economic support to families. They included cash transfers and support for the dual 
breadwinner model and a stress on quality in nutrition, day care, education and health 
care, with the interconnection between policy areas being important, producing an 
integrated, holistic and mutually reinforcing set of provision. Whether the contemporary 
version lives up to these ideals is debatable. 
 
It was Gunnar Myrdal who introduced the concept of productive social policy. Here we 
see also a link to ideas of social democracy as they developed in Sweden: “guaranteeing 
income security in particular was seen as a vital element in helping to overcome workers’ 
fear of change and thus of economic restructuration” (Morel et al. 2012:4). Swedish 
social democracy in its heyday had reconciled the goals of equality and efficiency, 
resolved the tension between individual security and social solidarity and between rights 
and responsibilities, with social rights acting to support economic development and 
efficiency.  
In today’s social investment model, the dual earner assumptions found in Sweden remain. 
The argument was that the conservative-corporatist model in particular would need to 
revise its traditional, male breadwinner ideas. These so-called frozen conservative, 
continental welfare states were seen as least ready to adapt. They were criticized as 
unable to create jobs, with high youth unemployment being seen as a key warning sign. 
Others proposed, rather than the social investment model, a more robust acceptance of the 
“Anglo Saxon”, or liberal, model with its arguments for flexibility through lowering 
wages and reducing the security of employment. Germany responded to these pressures, 
adopted revised policies and appeared able to survive, including adapting to reunification, 
through a combination of sound budgeting and social investment. Germany was able to 
create jobs. 
                                                 
11  In Singapore, nine-tenths of the government’s efforts towards social protection consist of contributions to the country’s 
Central Provident Fund, a compulsory savings scheme from which Singaporeans can draw for housing, health care 
and retirement.  
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Palier and Martin have disputed the “frozen landscape” criticism of Bismarckian welfare 
systems. “On the contrary,” they claim, “ Bismarckian welfare systems have changed a 
lot...structural, institutional and paradigmatic changes are indeed taking place” (Palier 
and Martin 2007:541). Initially, these welfare systems had responded to crisis by 
increasing social expenditure and social contributions to finance a labour-shedding 
strategy. They later restructured in line with the dominant social policy agenda set at the 
international level, as by OECD. This has, however, resulted in an increase in the 
insider/outsider cleavage.  
 
Currently the Swedish system too is under pressure (Schierup and Alund 2011). Twenty 
percent of the Swedish population is now foreign born or second generation.12 There has 
been a growth in extremist populism and an increase in the unprotected or semi-
clandestine sector of the labour market, and in youth unemployment and urban 
segregation: this has led to rioting and violence in Swedish cities. Developments in the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of other European and North American cities are now 
replicated in Sweden. Segregation, racialized exclusion, and concentrated poverty 
produce a state of continuous low scale rebellion, occasionally erupting into riots. The 
1990s saw a neoliberal turn in Swedish politics and the adoption of Third Way ideas by 
the social democrats—ideas of business-friendly policies, stressing lifelong learning, 
employability and ethnic entrepreneurship. Equal opportunities rather than equality of 
outcome were the aim. This period saw a “gradual demise of the welfare state protective 
framework of social citizenship”(Schierup and Alund 2011:50). Sweden moved towards 
the liberal end of the welfare regime continuum (see also (Belfrage and Ryner 2009). 
Large-scale and long-term unemployment posed challenges to the existing system; 
elements similar to US style workfare were introduced, creating a marginalized reserve 
army in precarious low wage employment, among whom are a high proportion of 
migrants. A Centre-Right government in 2006 introduced root and branch workfare and 
reduced some elements of health insurance coverage. The dual labour market became 
progressively more polarized, and there was a growth in social inequalities (Schierup and 
Alund 2011:51). An underclass emerged and became prominent in neo-conservative 
discourse. Citizenship now depends on a language test, value conformity and adherence 
to a disciplinary workfare regime.  
 
In Australia, similarly, a shift in welfare reform occurred as a response to the economic 
crisis. “Income management” was incorporated into social assistance programmes, such 
that a proportion of income support had to be set aside for essential household needs and 
expenses, and recipients were not allowed to spend this on alcohol, tobacco or gambling. 
Australia continues to have one of the most selective and highly targeted systems of 
social security in the Western world. In crisis there was little room for cuts in what was 
already a residual welfare state so tightening of conditions of receipt of benefit was the 
main option available (Saunders and Deeming 2011).  
 
One question to bear in mind when considering the social investment perspective relates 
to how far and in what ways these ideas were actually put into practice. Social investment 
ideas were taken up and implemented in different ways in liberal, corporatist and social 
democratic regimes with varying effects, for example, how far quality work was sidelined 
for “any job will do”. How far did up-skilling occur in practice and how far did social 
policies reduce women’s dual burden as they were forced to engage in paid work in 
increasing numbers? Key issues became overworked mothers and the quality and quantity 
                                                 
12  In Malmo, two out of five people were born abroad or have one or both parents who were born abroad, and half of 
children under five speak a mother tongue other than Swedish (Schierup and Alund 2011). 
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of child-rearing, nursery provision and schooling, and the well-being of children. Critics 
of the social investment perspective objected to its productivist assumptions with 
everyone, including children, being seen solely as workers or potential workers—a 
narrow vision of human aspiration (Lister 2003).  
 
European and Latin American policies have been seen as moving in similar directions 
(Arza 2012; Cortes 2008). A common social investment perspective includes the 
objective of “making work pay”, not simply by making it compulsory and competitive 
with social benefit rates but also by supplementing wages, providing low cost services or 
both (Jenson 2009; Jenson 2010). Aspects of both targeting and universalism are 
combined. Plans may target adult savers through microcredit programmes and may 
promote the assets of children and young people. The middle class as well as the working 
class and the poor may benefit from social policy, with allowance for universal 
programmes and social benefits so long as these can be seen as investments in the future, 
focusing on children and human capital development. Targeting some benefits directly to 
the poor is seen as quite compatible with this approach. Similarly, targeting programmes 
at lone mothers is seen as acceptable if it advances opportunities for children. In-work 
benefits to provide incentives to low income earners to enter and stay in the labour force 
expanded rapidly in the early part of the twenty-first century, especially where these 
targeted parents and children.  
 
In supporting the social investment approach, Esping-Andersen advocated a new gender 
contract supporting a child-centred strategy (Esping-Andersen 1996b, 1996a). The key 
was to support women in the labour force. This is seen by many as an advance. Others are 
more sceptical. Within the social investment perspective, “explicit attention to adult 
women is overwhelmingly focused on maternity and particularly their contribution to 
demographic growth” (Jenson 2010:465). There is no attention to feminist demands such 
as for equal pay. Investing in children is central, rather than women’s rights and 
redressing the unequal contribution to caring. As Molyneux explained clearly, the new 
social policies involve equality measures for girls but maternalist measures for their 
mothers (Molyneux 2006). Jenson concludes that the social investment perspective 
converges around a package of ideas about modernization, social inclusion and social 
investment (Jenson 2010:471). Gender equality, however, is not one of its aims (Jenson 
2009).  
 
The Social Investment paradigm is thus a middle way, compromise or third way between 
the Keynesian and the neoliberal paradigms. The social investment paradigm appears 
able to combine universalism and targeting. Countries differ in terms of the generosity 
and accessibility of their schemes. The orientation generally tends to favour the neoliberal 
end of the continuum and where policies fall in practice reflects the strength of forces 
supporting one or other set of values and goals, varying across countries and over time. 
The two opposing positions, as we have seen, differ on a number of dimensions 
regarding: their diagnosis on unemployment; the relation between social policy and the 
economy; values and principles; key norms for public action; and key instruments. In 
particular, the social investment perspective reflects neoliberalism in seeing 
unemployment as principally linked to inadequate skills (rather than to insufficient 
demand) and labour market rigidities (labour costs and regulation and social benefits). 
Where the old Keynesian welfare state had assumed only male full employment and the 
neoliberal model was obsessed with activation policies, the social investment paradigm at 
its best aimed to pay attention to quality in employment, social inclusion through 
employment and supportive public provision. Whether it achieved this in practice varied. 
The social investment state could have a positive role to play through empowering rather 
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than directing: soft instruments such as guidance and networking are preferred. Key 
instruments might involve job creation, social services, investment in early childhood 
care and education, especially to minimize the intergenerational transfer of poverty. In 
practice, these aspects are found more often in social democratic political formations. In 
all versions, however, the stress is on the primacy of employment and employability—
how this is pursued varies across countries.  
 
 
Universalism and targeting in each model of social security 
 Liberal and 
Neoliberal 
Conservative 
Corporatist 
Social 
Democratic 
Social 
Investment 
Method Means testing  
Workfare 
Modest level of 
benefits 
State regulator 
Role for voluntary 
and church-based 
organizations 
Earnings-related 
principle 
Social insurance 
contributions 
Middle class 
included 
Tax-paying middle 
class 
ALMP includes 
training and 
education 
ALMP 
Modernized 
enabling role for 
state 
Subsidies to 
wages 
Flexicuritya 
Object Poverty alleviation 
 
Security 
Maintain status 
differentials 
Reduce class 
inequality/ high 
redistribution 
Cover wide range 
of risks 
Support families 
Respond to new 
social risks 
Increase 
competitiveness 
 
Effect High inequality 
Low redistribution  
Social partners 
involved in 
governance 
Median 
redistribution 
High standard of 
provision  
High standard of 
well-being for 
population and 
children 
 
Rationale Fear of moral 
hazard 
Subsidiarity 
principle 
Work ethic 
National identity 
Make work pay 
Future orientation 
Self-governance 
for majority 
Context Weak organized 
labour 
Federal political 
system 
Social partnership 
Strong public 
sector unions 
Women’s political 
participation 
Globalization  
Notes: a Flexible social security: midway between so-called bureaucratic social security as developed in Western 
welfare states in the twentieth century and the need for flexibility to meet the needs of the more dynamic and 
diverse societies of the twenty-first century, including part time work, caring responsibilities and women’s needs. 
Current Trends 
A key test of social investment ideas is how in practice the unemployed and workless are 
treated. Current debates around universalism or targeting take place in the shadow of the 
2008 financial crisis which in some countries (like Spain and Greece) has led to high 
unemployment, cuts in public sector provision and employment, cuts in pensions and 
other entitlements in order to meet the requirements of “bail-outs”. Vis and colleagues 
have compared the response to the financial crisis of Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States (Vis et al. 2011). While in the crises 
of the 1970s and 1980s, the welfare state had been seen as a cause of crisis, in the most 
recent crisis this was not the case. The response has been to emphasize activation to 
maximize labour market participation. The welfare state was seen as an acceptable shock 
absorber initially but concerns about debt and deficits are likely to question this in the 
longer term. Concern for the long-term fiscal sustainability of welfare state programmes 
has grown. In the Netherlands, there has been a shift to a workfare model, meaning 
“social protection in exchange for improved labour market participation and mobility” 
(Yerkes and Veen 2011).  
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The universality of social rights remains intact but access to these rights has 
become increasingly selective and conditional and there is more emphasis on 
activation…while universality has remained (either in the form of welfare or in 
combination with workfare) conditionality and targeting has increased and 
activation has become increasingly important...Social rights have become 
increasingly conditional, targeted and directed at re-commodification (Yerkes and 
Veen 2011:434–436). 
 
In the United Kingdom, changes introducing a new Employment Support Allowance 
have been part of a broader international transformation from welfare to workfare states. 
They reflect a shift from Fordist welfare capitalism to post-Fordist workfare capitalism. 
Proponents of the changes characterised the former as involving centralized universal 
systems and ideas of passive recipients of unconditional benefits: the latter they 
characterize as pluralist, involving targeted assistance for active recipients provided on 
conditions. However while the language is of reintegration, the reality is of poor quality, 
low paid and insecure work and increasingly harsh treatment in the social assistance 
system, involving reductions in level and range of benefits, increased use of sanctions for 
infringement of rules (often unfairly) out-sourcing of assessments to private for profit 
companies and use of unsuitable, formulaic measures rather than clinical judgement in 
awarding rights to disability benefits.13 The main aim is to reassert labour discipline 
using shame and stigma as sticks. People with disabilities or chronic health conditions are 
no longer seen as automatically deserving. This especially impacts on those with mental 
illnesses (Bambra and Smith 2010). 
 
Entitlement to collective welfare is now often restricted to those who have little or no 
chance in the labour market and who cannot be held individually responsible for a social 
risk. In the Netherlands, increased emphasis on selectivity and decreased universalism 
with regard to health care insurance has also been observed (Yerkes and Veen 2011:440). 
Yerkes and Veen observe a weakening of political opposition to changes and they expect 
increased selectivity in future and increased stress on workfare.  
Relevance of These Issues for Emerging Economies  
Mkandawire has noted the importance of the debate about universalism or targeting for 
social development (Mkandawire 2005). Where the main goal was poverty alleviation, 
the choice between targeting and universalism was couched in the language of efficient 
allocation of resources, with reference to budget constraints and issues of globalization. 
Efficiency trumped equity in these considerations. Targeting was claimed to be more 
cost-effective as administration moved from what were said to be incompetent and 
corrupt government bureaucracies to non-governmental or commercial groups who 
managed projects and programmes. These institutional arrangements were thought to 
allow a clear delimitation of tasks and measurement of costs and benefits.  
 
Existing systems (for example in Latin America or Asia) were criticized as stratified, 
privileging groups linked to nation building or industrialization, such as state 
functionaries, the military or key workers. They were seen as biased towards urban 
workers. Critics argued they helped to sustain a labour aristocracy which ignored the 
marginalized populations. It was said that state welfare had been captured by special 
interest groups. While such observations call for reform, the question is in what direction 
should this go—towards greater universalism or more targeting? 
                                                 
13 See http://worktestwhistleblower.blogspot.co.uk/. 
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The feedback loop in universalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feedback loops in targeted systems. 
 
 
  
Universalism 
public provision; 
state 
responsibility; 
tax paying public; 
social solidarity 
more equal 
society; overall 
social well-being; 
social  cohesion 
public service 
ethic; state 
capacity; trust in 
government 
pooling of risks; 
lower admin 
costs; cross 
subsidy; high 
quality; resilience 
Targeting 
diverse affluent 
society; 
efficiency of 
markets; rational 
man; incentives 
and disincentives 
innovation; 
business friendly; 
responsive; 
individual choice; 
work ethic;  
ALMP; means 
testing 
focus on needy; 
respect 
individual and 
cultural 
differences 
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Universalism Targeting  
Assumptions 
Public provision can be efficient 
Key role for government 
State responsibility 
Population able and willing to pay taxes 
Shared universal human needs 
Common humanity 
Middle class inclusion 
Social Solidarity 
Assumptions 
Diverse and affluent society 
Market mechanism more efficient 
Not all risks equally shared 
Different life styles 
Rational man 
Sticks and carrots work 
 
Goals 
Concern for public good 
More equal society 
Overall social wellbeing 
Social justice 
Social cohesion 
Goals 
Efficiency and affordability 
Innovation 
Business friendly 
Responsive to users and consumers 
Specialized and adaptable systems 
Reduce moral hazard 
Maintain work ethic 
Individual choice 
Requirements 
Public service ethic 
Professional ethics 
State capacity 
Sound public management 
Sound budgets 
Honest politics 
Trust in government and professions 
Requirements 
Active labour market participation 
Involve the private sector 
Means testing  
Benefits 
Pooling of risks 
Large risk pool—efficient and lowers costs 
Lower administrative costs, high quality 
Allows redistribution and cross subsidies  
Resilient in crises, resistant to cut backs 
Benefits 
Individual and cultural preferences respected 
Most in need can be identified 
 
 
 
There are both philosophical and practical disagreements between those arguing for either 
universalism or targeting. These arguments have been rehearsed by many writers.14 For 
universalists, shared provision is a good in itself, supporting a set of values which 
privilege ideas of the public, common humanity and social justice, that is, there is an 
ethical imperative. These ideas often link to traditional, religious concepts, for example of 
the duty to provide hospitality and assistance to the stranger, the principle of altruism. It 
may be that this is also practical self-interest as one may oneself be in need of help from 
strangers one day (especially following accident, catastrophe or crisis). By contrast to 
these idealistic notions, ideas of targeting are presented as realistic, hard-headed, 
technical and neutral proposals but, their opponents comment, they actually serve the 
interests of the rich and powerful. 
Arguments for targeting 
Efficiency: Targeted schemes are seen as more efficient and less wasteful; such schemes 
are said to be value neutral—means testing is just an efficient way to target resources; 
theoretically schemes can involve inspecting the incomes of the rich as well as of the 
poor.  
 
Involve private sector: Private firms can be outsourced and can specialize in delivery. 
The adoption of business criteria increases efficiency. 
 
                                                 
14  See for example Titmuss (1981); Le Grand (1986, 1987); Le Grand and Bartlett (1993); Townsend (2002); MacGregor 
(1981; 1999). 
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Encourage work: Such schemes reduce moral hazard and malingering, helping to 
maintain the work ethic. 
Arguments against targeting 
Poor services: Selective systems involve discrimination against vulnerable populations. 
Services for the poor will be poor services. 
 
Increased costs overall: If cuts are made in universal benefits, this will lead to a 
downward spiral with, over time, an increased need for means-tested provision. The 
unintended consequence of cutting universal benefits in the name of savings will be of 
increased costs in other parts of the system. Risk pools are narrower, for example the 
family or an occupation group. 
 
Failure to meet need: The lack of attention to the whole person in targeted schemes 
means they are often ineffective. Much targeting assumes that it is possible to identify 
simple needs and simple outcomes. A complex array of separate, targeted programmes 
appears, often provided by different contractors with different funding regimes, different 
categories and rules, and different time scales. The result is often inefficient and 
unprofitable. The solution is sometimes thought to lie with better linking of information 
systems through advanced computing but the experience has often been of failure and 
high costs and wastage. Ethical issues also arise around the sharing of information with 
commercial providers. What is promoted as simplification, in practice can result in more 
complexity and inefficiency.  
 
Poverty and inequality: There is a trade-off between the degree of low income targeting 
and the size of the budget available for redistribution (Korpi and Palme 1998). The 
outcomes of market-based redistribution are more unequal than are those of earnings-
related social insurance programmes. This is the paradox of redistribution: the more 
benefits are targeted at the poor and the greater the effort to create equality through equal 
public transfers to all, the less likely it is that poverty and inequality will be reduced. If 
protection is removed, needs increase with either unacceptable suffering resulting or the 
need for more costly interventions later to deal with the secondary handicaps of poverty 
and ill-health. 
 
Politically divisive: The political and social consequences of targeted systems are a build-
up of tension between those receiving benefits and those just above them in the income 
scale. 
Arguments for universalism 
Support for the public sphere: Social legislation affects habits and values (Sulkunen and 
Warsell 2012) and promotes the public realm as a protection against the unbridled power 
of private interests (Clarke 2004). The shared experience of shared provision increases a 
sense of shared citizenship. 
 
More potential for redistribution: The size of the redistributive budget is not fixed but 
depends on the structure of welfare state institutions. Social insurance institutions are of 
central importance to redistributive outcomes. Universal schemes allow the possibility of 
robust redistribution and cross-subsidy to sustain access on the basis of need. 
 
Higher quality: Because of the inclusion of the broad mass of the population, universal 
schemes tend to be of higher quality as they mobilize the sharp elbows of the middle 
classes in scrutinizing performance. 
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Meets need and protects against risks: Social protection is critically a form of prevention, 
an insurance against catastrophic experiences as a result of unemployment, sickness or 
disability. Human beings, especially those in need of social protection, have complex 
needs and their situations can vary over time. To deal with this complexity and 
variability, an integrated systems approach is best. At best, universal schemes for social 
protection are integrated into and link with other areas of social policy, acting in a 
mutually supportive and reinforcing manner.  
 
Efficient: Certain public goods are best provided at the highest level of government, with 
tax collection being optimal at the highest (national) level. In the collective/universal 
system, all are in the same risk pool, generally the nation-state. The pooling of risks is a 
key principle: systems will be more efficient and have lower costs, the more are included 
in the scheme. All benefit from a larger risk pool. The universal system is simpler and 
less complicated and administrative costs are lower. 
 
Promotes solidarity and trust: All citizens are included on the same terms regardless of 
class, income and status: this is the hallmark of solidaristic legislation (Baldwin 1990). 
All benefit because risks are unpredictable and outside individual control. 
Arguments against universalism 
Unresponsive and inflexible: Universalism can be authoritarian. These systems developed 
alongside ideas of rational planning and privileged the technical expert. Public provision 
is monolithic, standardized and uniform. Universalism no longer meets the wishes of 
more diverse and affluent societies.  
 
Costly: Social budgets are “too expensive”; “we cannot afford it”. Inefficient government 
bureaucracies are often hide-bound by union power and involve wasteful collection and 
redistribution of resources (with some sticking to the fingers of those who do the 
collecting and redistributing). 
 
Strategy of equality misplaced: Universal programmes have benefited the middle classes 
and those who work in the systems administering them, not the poor (Le Grand 1982). 
 
Promotes dualism: Universalism only works in certain types of society: “the solidarity of 
flat-rate universalism [my italics] presumes a historically peculiar class structure, one in 
which the vast majority of the population are ‘little people’ for whom a modest, albeit 
egalitarian, benefit may be considered adequate. Where this no longer obtains, as occurs 
with growing working-class prosperity and the rise of the new middle classes, flat-rate 
universalism inadvertently produces dualism because the better off turn to private 
insurance and other methods to enhance schemes to meet standards they expect...the 
result is that the wonderfully egalitarian spirit of universalism turns into a dualism similar 
to that of the social assistance state: the poor rely on the state and the remainder on the 
market” (Esping-Andersen 1990:25; see also Ferragina and Seeleib Kaiser 2011:596). 
 
The concept of public service ethic is naive: The belief that there was such a thing as a 
public service, professional ethic, one that supplied a better motive to providers of such 
things as health care than the maximization of profits, has been criticized by Julian Le 
Grand (1997). He argued that the old model of the professions required the public to 
believe that all practitioners were “knights” who could be trusted to work to the best of 
their abilities because of their professional commitments. But, he argued, few people 
were thorough-going knights. It was better to err on the side of caution and treat everyone 
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as a potential “knave”, best controlled through establishing market relationships between 
providers and their customers, wherever possible replacing professional ethics with quasi 
markets (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Le Grand 1997). 
 
Not all risks are equally shared: Many of the risks covered in social protection schemes 
have their base in individual choices and preferences and forms of behaviour. For 
example, it may be an individual’s choice to smoke or drink or eat unhealthily or engage 
in unsafe sex: if so, they should bear the costs of this lifestyle. Universalist schemes 
contain perverse incentives: they do not encourage healthy, sober and diligent living as 
benefits go equally to the “deserving” and “undeserving”. Instead they encourage 
freeloading. The assumption that everyone is willing to work hard and not claim 
unnecessarily is assumed in universalistic schemes but is naive. 
The Influence of Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
Kangas and Palme have commented on the extent to which myth, rather than reality, is 
present in much of the debate on the welfare state with the battle of ideas being divorced 
from empirical evidence. One example of the workings of myth is the idea of the welfare 
state as overly bureaucratic or that it serves the interests of providers. On the contrary, 
they argue, the lessons of the Nordic model are that democratization can bring pressures 
for an expansion of social policy, and social policy can contribute to democracy. The 
Nordic model demonstrates considerable achievements with regard to the reduction of 
poverty. The role of the state is vindicated, as these countries show high levels of 
prosperity and rapid economic growth despite high social spending, showing that is it 
possible to unify social protection with competitive and growth-oriented economies 
(Kangas and Palme 2005). 
 
Universal systems are thus extremely appropriate to the changed current climate and 
context rather than being outdated and inappropriate. The Nordic welfare model survived 
the test of the 1990s. From the 1990s, adjustment was made by raising taxes and 
restricting the growth of public expenditures but not by changing the basic structure of 
the national welfare model. “The Nordic countries can still thus be regarded as advanced 
welfare states with high public employment, universal benefit systems, extensive publicly 
provided welfare services, high taxes, low poverty and corporatist labour market 
structures” (Kangas and Palme 2005:12). Similarly, the German corporatist model 
survived the test of unification and has emerged as the strongest economy in Europe.  
 
It may be, however, that this solidaristic, universal model is appropriate only to a few 
mainly northern European countries with particular histories and cultures.  
 
Universal systems such as those in the Nordic countries appear to require a degree of 
social homogeneity. They rely on and encourage relatively high trust in government. It 
may go without saying that any system of social protection requires the production of a 
surplus so that economic growth is a precondition. However, economic growth alone is 
not a driver. For adequate systems of health and social protection to develop, the well-
being of the population as a whole has to become a government priority in order to be a 
political goal (Acharya et al. 2012). The institutionalization of universal schemes has to 
come from government (the state) to be effective, as only the state is able to back up 
decisions through the application of the law and ultimately by force.  
 
These universalist systems depend on the population being willing to pay taxes and that 
there are sufficient taxpayers to support the dependent population. The sustainability of 
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the Nordic model, for example, hinges on the number of taxpayers that can be mobilized. 
This is why the issue of demographic change is of such importance to the debate, as the 
ageing of the population may reduce the proportion of contributors to schemes (especially 
where contributions are insurance payments by employers and employees) unless 
changes are made to the age of retirement and taxation is levelled equally on the older 
population. 
 
The acceptance of state responsibility for the welfare of the whole population is crucial. 
This may come about, as we have seen, through the necessities and experiences of war or 
from concerns with economic development or through capture of the state by parties 
promoting these interests and values.15 
 
However, the experience of Britain and New Zealand, where radical change to the Right 
was implemented from the 1980s, shows that sets of institutions can change quickly and 
in turn shape political values and social attitudes. Yet if in one direction, why not in the 
other?  
 
Social policy choices are mediated and shaped by historical and contemporary contexts, 
especially through the influence of ideas, interests and institutions. A process of policy 
feedback occurs so that sets of institutions support and develop values and attitudes (see 
diagrams above). These institutions can be placed on a continuum with regard to their 
emphasis on either universalism or targeting. This choice is not merely a technical 
question: the procedures adopted in deciding who is entitled, how to deliver and how to 
fund health and social security are themselves socially structured and have consequences, 
helping to form habits and values. 
 
That is to say, the procedures of social security or social protection schemes are 
themselves embedded in wider institutions and link to other social and economic policies. 
It is the overall institutional framework which impacts on general standards of welfare or 
well-being in a society. In particular, social policy cannot be understood or improved 
without considering its connection to economic policy.16 The ISSA and the ILO both 
agree that “decent work” is essential to social progress (ISSA 2012, 2013). Recently the 
idea has gained currency of the need to pay attention to “pre-distribution” rather than 
redistribution in social policy. This clumsy word is a new way of retrieving older values, 
which formed the basis of social democratic agendas and remain the key principles in 
Nordic and many European countries (Hacker and Pierson 2010b, 2010a). Principally 
what is meant is that fair social policies rely on a context of fairer and more equal original 
pre-tax incomes or functional incomes, and a politics that pays less attention to organized 
lobbyists and more to the majority of voters.  
 
 
This overview has demonstrated the important role of ideas in discussions of social 
security and indicated the part played by individuals and agencies in promoting certain 
                                                 
15  For example in Britain, during the Second World War, a new definition of state responsibility arose: “no longer did 
concern rest on the belief that, in respect to many social needs, it was proper to intervene only to assist the poor and 
those who were unable to pay for services of one kind and another. Instead, it was increasingly regarded as a proper 
function or even obligation of Government to ward off distress and strain, among not only the poor but almost all 
classes of society” (Titmuss 1950). The principle of universalism was added to that of collective responsibility, 
abolishing social discrimination and improving standards. “Poor Law” provision on a “standard inflexible in 
administration and attuned to a philosophy which regarded individual distress as a mark of social incapacity” was 
replaced by willingness to pool national resources and share risks (Titmuss 1950). 
16  An integral part of this process has been the privatization of social policy: “the demonstrated willingness of 
governments to cut public spending and public sector debt has almost become a litmus test of credibility for 
international portfolio managers” (Standing 1999:79). Protective regulation was eroded, contracts were individualized, 
tax and social security contributions were avoided (p. 81) while at the same time “private pensions have become big 
business and pension funds have become major players in the corporate economy globally” (Standing 1999:270). 
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policies. Idea entrepreneurs have been significant in promoting neoliberal ideas and those 
of social investment in recent decades. There is now a need for new radical ideas to begin 
to think differently about health and social security provision to promote the value of 
well-being for all. 
 
Ideas go nowhere unless supported by powerful interests in the political process. 
Whatever options are put forward, they need political support. Policies for social security 
cannot be based purely on altruism, although that has played a part in forming alliances. 
But it is essential to consider the interests of key groups when proposing policies if they 
are to have any realistic chance of being taken seriously. 
 
A widening of the scope of social policy through government intervention has resulted 
from changes in the representation of groups in government. Left governments have 
played critical roles in the extension of social rights. With regard to interests, traditionally 
labour played the key role but historians have shown that the middle classes have also 
been very important. The alliance between middle and working classes was the base of 
universalistic welfare states (Baldwin 1990).17 The value of including the middle class in 
any social security system is that the system will be more resilient and encourage equality, 
and the more equal the society, the more everyone benefits through improved overall 
well-being (Wilkinson and Pickett 2011). 
 
Studies have shown that earnings-related corporatist and encompassing programmes both 
retained middle-class support for the welfare state. The key sociological insight is to note 
that the structure of institutions shapes organized interest groups and makes these real, 
turning categories into real human associations, for example, through being involved in 
partnership policies and governance arrangements. Social security programmes thus have 
a socio-political as well as an economic role.  
 
The political battle over social security is a distributive conflict under specific relations of 
power among major interest groups. The conclusion is that partisan politics matters. 
Socioeconomic class remains relevant in democratic politics. Distributive conflicts are 
generated in labour markets, and employment relations remain basic for most citizens. 
However, while generally universalist ideas and policies have been supported by the Left 
and targeting supported by the Right, other interest groups have been as important as 
class. In current circumstances, issues relating to gender, age and ethnicity need to be 
included, responding to new social risks as well as old ones. The institutions which have 
been the building blocks in the process of expanding social security coverage have 
included trade unions, local governments, mutual funds and state bureaucracies. In many 
systems, an important interest group are older people: some prophesy intergenerational 
conflict as a key issue for the future that needs to be addressed (Busemeyer et al. 2009), 
although the way these differences are framed is also part of an ideological attack on 
universalism, and it is often forgotten that today’s middle aged will one day be old 
themselves so they may be being short sighted if they support reducing entitlements for 
older people. 
 
We have seen that powerful groups have framed the debate about social security and 
influenced what policies have been implemented. New proposals too would have to link 
                                                 
17  Interestingly, Wilensky (1976) noted that conditions supporting solidarity exist where the “middle mass” does not 
perceive its tax burden as grossly unfair, relative to that of the rich and upper middle class, and where these strata do 
not feel great social distance from the poor. He observed that it was also helpful if the tax system had low visibility, for 
example, where there was least reliance on direct income taxes or property taxes on households and more reliance on 
sales or value added taxes. It was also helpful he observed if private welfare systems were limited and the military 
establishment was modest.  
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to groups contending for power in any system, especially parties, trade unions and social 
movements. This should be obvious but it is remarkable how often policies are discussed 
without any reference to who might support them.  
  
When discussing policies, attention is paid to design but issues of implementation are just 
as important. Policy makers have to start from where they are, adopting a pragmatic and 
experimental approach, learning from others and from history, and ensuring that the 
policies they design are appropriate and acceptable in the national political and cultural 
context. 
 
Whether change will come about depends on the potential to push through reform which 
varies in different systems, with more centralized systems with concentrated political 
authority being able to do this more easily: where authority is dispersed, attempts to 
negotiate a settlement are the more likely form. Differential state capacity is key in 
explaining differences between countries’ social policies (Evans et al. 1985). State 
capacity refers to the ideological and administrative capacities of governments to adopt 
interventionist policies. Systems and policies should also aim to support and help to 
develop strong civil society institutions, which can act to counterbalance the power of 
elected governments and protect funds from short-term political battles. Measures to root 
out corruption in administration are essential if implementation is to be effective.  
  
Universalism and targeting can go together. Selective provision can be added on to a 
universal system as a supplement not as a replacement, which could be an appropriate 
way for complex societies to meet diverse needs. Universal and targeted measures are not 
mutually exclusive. Even in universal social security systems, there is a place for social 
assistance linked to special needs (perhaps assessed taking into account social or medical 
conditions).18 The issue is the balance between the different pillars of social protection: 
universalism and selectivity. New social risks have appeared but it is important to note 
that the old risks remain common—such as unemployment, ill health, old age and child 
care—and the evidence is that these shared risks are growing, not reducing. 
Issues and Challenges for Emerging Economies  
A number of conditions constrain options for policies for universal health and social 
security. Demographic changes are occurring with increased size of populations, and in 
many countries, an ageing of the population is leading to a reduction in the ratio of 
working to dependent people, while other countries are characterized by large numbers of 
younger people. Changes in the labour force, especially involving increases in women 
working and an associated increase in precarious, insecure, part-time employment, pose 
challenges to traditional forms of social security. Globalization has involved increased 
migration, challenging notions of citizenship as the basis for social rights. All societies 
see increased polarization, inequality, poverty and marginalization, alongside vast 
increases in wealth and the attraction of values of individualism and diversity, which 
challenge notions of universalism and collectivism. At the same time, however, basic 
human vulnerabilities to sickness, accidents, old age, death, child-bearing and rearing 
remain and are common to all societies. 
 
Ian Gough has compared countries on the dimensions of international factors, 
socioeconomic environment, political mobilization, state institutions, social policies and 
welfare outcomes. He points out differences in welfare regimes in the South compared to 
                                                 
18  For example, specific measures to compensate for women’s interrupted careers (through “contribution credits” for 
child-rearing) were introduced in Chile. 
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the North to indicate that theories and explanations emerging from studies in the North 
cannot be automatically applied to emerging economies (Gough 2000). International 
factors which influence the profile of social security regimes in the South include a 
history of colonialism, settler societies or externally constrained development. Economic 
dependency in the international economy is an influential factor, with Southern countries 
being in a different position in the international political economy, one marked by greater 
levels of indebtedness and capital inflows and sectoral imbalances in domestic 
economies.19 This economic dependency links to degrees of political dependency in the 
international polity. Usually in emerging economies, a greater role has been played by 
international organizations, whether global (World Bank, IMF, UN etc.), supra-national 
NGOs, or powerful Northern states. 
 
Socioeconomic factors which influence the potential for universal health and social 
security include levels of marketization, industrialization and income.20 Different forms 
of peasantry, land ownership, kin structures, household forms and gendered relationships 
also need to be taken into account.  
 
Gough argues that the emerging economies, when compared to Northern welfare states, 
have a different distribution of power resources. There tends to be weaker class 
organization of politics and more particularistic, regional, patrimonial and clientelistic 
forms, resulting in the “adverse incorporation” of weaker groups. State institutions may 
involve a less embedded, or absent, set of democratic practices. Social policies cover a 
greater range of functional alternatives to Western-style social protection beyond the 
state, for example religious, enterprise-based, NGO, foreign aid, local/communal, clan 
and household provision. Consumption subsidies, agricultural support, work programmes 
and microcredit schemes also play a part. Welfare outcomes, almost by definition, are at 
lower levels, except among the rich (Gough 2000). 
 
In the current economic context, the most fundamental change has been the increase in 
women’s paid employment. A prominent feature is the phenomenon of informal 
employment, which is also highly gendered, irregular employment, as well as being 
simply low-paid. A key challenge for social security is how to incorporate these groups. 
Existing universalist systems have been criticized for encouraging dualism. Is it possible 
for them to be expanded to incorporate new groups? To reduce the impact of child-
bearing and career breaks on benefit levels, a universal non-contributory pillar could be 
created. Special benefits for special groups like the disabled exist in some schemes.  
 
Fundamental to social schemes are revenue raising and fair taxation: in the global 
economy a key question is how to tax the offshore rich, international oligarchs and 
transnational corporations, that seem able successfully to avoid national taxation. High 
state capacity in collecting and distributing taxes is essential to universalist schemes, 
resting on sound public management, sound budgets, transparent and honest politics, 
bureaucracies and professions and respect for a public service ethic. Arguments about 
                                                 
19  The degree of difference between North and South may be changing as the balance of power in world political 
economies alters. Indebtedness is a key problem for many Northern countries, and they too experience the intrusions 
of international financial agencies. 
20  For Guy Standing, “globalisation, technological change and the growth of flexible labour markets around the world have 
fundamentally changed the feasible institutional structures”. With the upheaval caused by the dominance of neoliberal 
policies, the economy has become disconnected from society. The relentless pressures to be flexible led to increased 
inequality and insecurity. A key trend has been the feminization of the labour force: “the changing role of women is 
perhaps the most important factor in changing the social policy agenda at the end of the century of the labouring man” 
(Standing 1999:81). He believes that flexible labour markets are the reality and policies need to respond: the 
assumption of regular full-time employment which underlay conservative and social democratic paradigms of welfare is 
no longer the norm. 
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affordability and waste have much resonance in a period where the need for sound 
finance is stressed. Recently social expenditure in a number of countries has been 
financed by public sector borrowing, creating fiscal deficits and requiring payment of 
interest to international finance lenders. 
 
Other challenges for social policy lie in the fact that increased social expenditure relies on 
economic growth. Slower economic growth generates fiscal strain: strains result from the 
maturation of government commitments and the transformation of household structures as 
well as population ageing as well as continuing high birth rates in some cases. In addition, 
changes in society due to influences like migration and consumerism have led to 
increasing diversity in the population with regard to needs, culture and values. Thus the 
contemporary, relatively fragmented, heterogeneous systems of organizing political 
interests are environments less favourable to expansive universal social rights (Pierson 
2001). 
 
Key questions for social security are: should social benefits and services be targeted just 
towards those on low incomes or be universal (that is, paid to all who fall into a category 
of need); should benefits be equal (flat rate and the same for all recipients) or should they 
be earnings-related? 
 
Those who say targeting offers the best way forward see “man” as a rational, calculating, 
economic actor, operating in a market, principally responding to signals sent by prices. 
Or, as in the behaviourist conception, as an individual striving to avoid pain and seeking 
pleasure, mainly influenced by incentives and encouraged by sticks and carrots. The 
contemporary reality, they claim, is of a general (and growing) lack of trust in 
government, politicians and administrators, and this creates a resistance to paying taxes. 
Changes in society due to influences like migration and consumerism have led to 
increasing diversity in the population with regard to needs, culture and values. Individuals 
know best what their preferences and interests are, so it is better to reduce state or central 
decisions about who gets what and allow as much as possible to be determined through 
personal choice.  
 
These are powerful comments. Are the ethics of solidarity and mutual aid incompatible 
with contemporary consumer capitalism (Bauman 2006)? We have seen that universalism 
works best the more equal and less stratified a society is and where there is an identifiable 
sense of common purpose and respect for the public realm.  
Policy Options 
Lessons gained from historical and comparative studies can be helpful to practical policy 
makers concerned to improve their national systems of social protection. All societies 
today face common pressures of urbanization, changes in family structures, demographic 
change and migration. They all need to consider both paid and unpaid work, how to 
support caring work, include the “precariat” in social security systems and avoid dualism 
(Standing 2011).21 To support democracy, they need to strengthen civil society 
institutions and pay attention to governance procedures to encourage trust and reduce 
corruption. The state’s role, rather than being reduced, remains crucial if not as a direct 
                                                 
21  Under the banner of structural adjustment, shock therapy and other supply-side economic policies, radical changes 
have taken place in labour market relations, “involving erosion of protective and pro-collective labor regulations, 
decentralization of wage determination, erosion of employment security and a trend to market regulation rather than 
statutory regulation of the labour market” (Standing 1999:584). In addition, as has been made clear in the most recent 
crisis, financial markets became disembedded from national economies, existing in their own global space (Standing 
1999, p. 66) and colonizing key spaces within global cities.  
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provider but as a tough regulator. States have to work together and develop supranational 
frameworks to challenge powerful international forces and to respond to international 
migration (Kaur 2010).22 Any effective social security system requires a reliable, honest 
and efficient financial administration to collect and redistribute resources.  
 
The current context in which discussions about social security are taking place has been 
defined as a “second modernity” characterized by global ecological and economic crises, 
widening transnational inequalities, precarious forms of paid work and other challenges of 
globalization that nation states cannot manage efficiently on their own.23 
 
When evaluating proposals for social protection schemes, the key question is whether 
these do or do not extend social rights. The idea of human rights now plays a central part 
in discussions of social policy.24 Universalist systems assume the existence of universal 
human needs, a common humanity: all humans are seen as having basic needs in common 
which cannot be reduced to individual or cultural preferences (Doyal and Gough 1991). 
This commonality also supports the value of experiences gained in one country in 
informing decisions made in another.  
 
What then are realistic options for social security? The minimal requirement would be for 
a social safety net as proposed by the World Bank and other global policy makers. The 
ILO alternatively proposed putting in place a global social protection floor as part of its 
Global Campaign for Social Security and Coverage for All, with the concept of the floor 
being critical as the foundation of a future project to build more expansive social security. 
(A riveting account of how this came about is given in Bob Deacon’s recent book; 
Deacon 2013). A broad definition of Dynamic Social Security has been presented by 
ISSA. This would involve innovative and evolving policies and processes geared to better 
ensure accessible and sustainable social protection systems that not only provide 
protection, encourage prevention, and support rehabilitation and reintegration but also 
contribute to better realizing socially inclusive and economically productive societies 
(McKinnon 2009).  
 
The requirements of effective systems are efficient and effective collection of 
contributions/finance, processing of claims, and payment of benefits. These systems 
would advance, at the very least, basic income security and access to health care for all. 
Such schemes would need to guard against any tendency towards minimalist or residual 
provision in social protection and promote quality, access and an adequate range in health 
care systems. Innovative systems would involve working in partnership with other social 
policy actors, including non-statutory social protection programmes and civil society 
initiatives. State social security could collaborate or work together in a mixed model of 
welfare, including community-based micro-insurance programmes, employment-based 
welfare funds, or non-contributory social pension programmes. 
 
Others argue that universal social development goals should be financed largely by tax 
revenues (and development aid). These views too stress the key social goal of providing 
basic income security and health care for all. The authors of Good Health at Low Cost 
                                                 
22  Key features of the globalized context are the growth of numbers of migrants and migration over long distances: there 
are now one billion migrants around the world who would be excluded from insurance schemes based on nationality. 
See also ISSA (2011b).   
23  Beck and Lau 2005; Dixon 2009; Crouch 2011; Standing 1999. 
24  Townsend 2002; Schrecker 2011; Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010. Articles 22 and 25 in the Declaration of Human Rights 
deal with the rights to an adequate standard of living and social security. Article 22 states that everyone as a member 
of society has the right to realize the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for their dignity while Article 25 
states that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and wellbeing, especially mothers 
and children.  
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(2011) see access to primary health care as the crucial requirement. Good health policies 
are more likely to emerge in supportive social policy and political contexts: this involves 
legislation, stakeholder partnerships, improved gender relations, bureaucratic 
effectiveness, an improved sense of solidarity and recognition of the role of civil society 
(Balabanova et al. 2011). 
 
Feminists have argued that social insurance systems need radical change if they are to 
recognize care work as a civic duty of equal value to paid employment and recompense 
care with contributory benefits (Pascall and Lewis 2004:382). The critical challenge is to 
rethink labour markets to bring unpaid care work, and particularly the reproductive sector, 
within the frameworks of analyses of the economy and markets, while also addressing the 
inequalities inherent in welfare systems that privilege market and labour-based 
contributory entitlements over needs-based claims to social assistance (Cook and Razavi 
2012). Policy proposals should recognize unpaid care work as a valuable social 
contribution, provide accessible and affordable well-regulated child care and provide 
decent employment (Cook 2012).  
 
Orloff, too, has argued that the question of women’s employment is now central to social 
policy because of changes in labour markets (Orloff 2002). Relevant factors include 
women’s rising education, the decline in men’s wages, declines in fertility and the 
instability of marriage. A key issue for social security then is how care giving is treated—
are credits for care awarded within social security, are there maternity benefits and 
provision for parental leave? An emerging division is between dual earner households and 
single earner households. Low income in adulthood presents a higher risk of poverty in 
old age.  
 
Standing has argued that there is a need to develop a blueprint for a global social security 
policy. Rights should be accorded on grounds of residence not citizenship, allowing 
migrants access to services and benefits. He supports the idea of a basic income 
((Standing 2011). Every legal resident of a country or community, children as well as 
adults, should be provided with a modest monthly payment. Supplements for special 
needs such as disability could be included. These would be paid to individuals and would 
be universal in being paid to all legal residents in the form of cash and without conditions. 
Above this level, individuals could earn but such income should be subject to tax.  
 
Arguments in favour of basic or citizens income are that it would sweep away divisions 
between deserving and undeserving and provide basic security to all, allowing individual 
flexibility in job search and combining care and employment. To implement it, however, 
would require other changes and controls, for example on migration, rents, housing, 
health and social care costs as, without supplements, for some people a basic income 
would be inadequate to provide an overall adequate standard of living. However those 
who argue for basic income do not see this as a way to solve everything but as a way to 
begin to think differently—to begin a process of regenerating progressive ideas in 
contemporary societies.  
 
Arguments against basic income are that it would lower labour supply, would be 
unaffordable, and a hand-out. Deacon and Cohen also see problems with a basic security 
model: “our hypothesis is that, in the long run, basic security institutions are likely to 
generate a split of interests and identities between middle classes and workers” (Deacon 
and Cohen 2011:431). This is the conclusion of this paper too. Throughout we have seen 
that alliances need to be forged between the middle and working classes if sustainable, 
universal systems are to be attained and the power of the super-rich challenged. Basic 
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security systems offer only low replacement rates, insufficient to maintain the living 
standards of the better-off workers and citizens, who are then tempted to participate in 
private solutions: the more the middle class move to private provision, the less support 
they will give to public programmes. Targeted programmes also split the working class, 
separating the poor from the better-off workers. Overall such systems produce increased 
fragmentation and division and reduce solidarity (Deacon and Cohen 2011). 
 
Deacon and Cohen thus support the important role of the middle class in helping to 
expand state responsibility for social welfare and a minimum standard of living. They 
argue that strengthening the middle class can contribute to improving the quality of life of 
the more vulnerable population (Deacon and Cohen 2011). They see a need to promote a 
global politics of solidarity geared to equality, social mobility and collective welfare. 
 
However, there need not be a hard and fast choice between basic income and earnings-
related social insurance. The two can be combined in a way that meets basic need but also 
encourages middle-class buy-in to the system. Ferge (1997) noted that historically social 
insurance developed to deal with what were then the new risks of an industrial mass 
society as the old ties linking generations and small communities were weakening. Now 
she thinks further changes in labour markets would call logically for an increase in social 
insurance, rather than its weakening. One way to make social insurance programmes more 
inclusive would involve mandatory affiliation and subsidies (Razavi et al. 2012).  
 
Pensions too would require a government-financed solidaristic pillar. There is value in 
multi-tiered programmes with contributions from employers, employees and state 
subsidies. To meet the fiscal and demographic challenges, there is a need to increase 
employment among the older groups. Social security needs to link to general systems of 
taxation, and there are good arguments for including property wealth in assessments for 
tax purposes. Savings should be encouraged. While there seems now to be greater 
acceptance of a rights based approach to social security, it has to be sustainable (Asher 
2009). 
 
A key variable to bear in mind in assessing the potential for universal social security lies 
in the element of state capacity. Necessary capabilities for efficient systems include 
information collection, computing capacity, data analysis, risk assessments, and the 
reliability and integrity of systems. Trust in government is essential for the functioning of 
all systems but especially so for the universalist: government—politicians and state 
employees—have to be seen as competent and as representing the national interest. This 
could be promoted through education and training, open meritocratic entry and 
transparency of appointments and payments. If the state cannot be trusted to carry out its 
functions honestly and efficiently, then it might be preferable to hand over administration 
of social security to NGOs, mutual funds or independent social insurance funds as a 
temporary measure, since an increased level of social security, including education, would 
enhance the capacity of the state. 
Conclusion 
The solidaristic welfare state is the exception. However, it is an ideal to work towards. 
The idea of a citizen’s or resident’s income is also idealistic at present, although a basic 
income for children, the disabled and elderly could be a starting point. With rising 
expectations, demands for protection against unavoidable risks and higher quality social 
provision will increase. Lessons can be learnt from experience of different systems. But 
models cannot be imposed or simply transferred across countries. Policies need to be 
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acceptable and appropriate, fitting in with the national context, respecting the legacy of 
previous policies and values and customs.  
 
There is a need for realism in proposing policies. Most countries have a form of capitalist 
economy and thus social security and the wage system are critically interlinked. The 
countries that have institutionalized methods to correct inequalities and injustices, and 
have developed democratic systems of government with strong civil society associations, 
show higher levels of overall well-being. The most resilient and stable systems of social 
security are those organized around a principle of social insurance, binding the majority 
together—including the ordinary and middle class workers—and recognizing the value of 
care work. For social security systems to work well, they need to be located within a fair 
wage system and progressive tax structure and supported by a comprehensive set of 
integrated economic and social policies. Developing universal social security is only 
one—but an important—part of a wider agenda for social reform. 
 
There are strong opposing forces within financial capitalism to any moves towards more 
progressive social and health policies and many of these operate at a remote level and are 
deliberately concealed. The argument of this paper has been that ultimately decisions are 
made by groups of people acting together politically to promote their vision. Politics 
matters—and can offer the promise and opportunity for change, building on analyses and 
experience with organization and willpower. 
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Appendix: Notes on Social Security Provision 
Within welfare regimes, social security is a particular set of arrangements. These may 
include risk-pooling social insurance programmes, poverty alleviation social assistance 
programmes, universal tax-financed programmes, individual account (public and private) 
savings programmes, or mandatory private insurance.  
 
Social security is now often referred to as social protection (to avoid confusion perhaps 
with US old-age social security programmes) but this tends to ignore its contribution to 
social production and social reproduction. It is taken to include measures such as 
unemployment insurance, pension programmes, direct social assistance to poor 
households and labour market regulations. A wider definition might involve systems of 
paying for health care. In some countries, however, health care is provided as a public 
good. Other related social provision such as education may either be paid for directly or 
be provided publically. However as outlined long ago in the Beveridge Report (1942), 
policies for social security need to be set in the context of other policies to understand 
their impact and to be effective, such as policies for employment, health care, housing, 
education and training. Social security is one important policy lever but it works best if in 
harmony with other policies.  
 
In the nineteenth century, Bismarck led the way in Germany with insurance for health 
(1883), accident (1884), disability and old age (1889). These involved distinct 
programmes for different class and status groups. State insurance acted to tie the worker 
as a citizen into loyalty to the government and offset the appeal of socialism. This type of 
system led over time to a complex array of specific insurance funds often involving a 
privileged position for civil servants. State-sponsored insurance systems on a national 
scale were instituted in all European countries during the first third of the twentieth 
century. Key elements involved income guarantees to provide for risks such as 
unemployment, sickness or old age and public provision to meet needs such as for health, 
education and housing. Through the twentieth century, forms of unemployment insurance 
developed25 (Alber 1982). While there was a general trend to provide unemployment 
insurance, the timing and pace of development varied markedly. The development of 
minimum income (MI) schemes was similarly varied in Europe26 (Figari et al. 2013).  
 
A key trend was for the state to become involved in social protection. Initially, 
unemployment was met through trade union, mutual support, schemes and local 
government schemes. The development of state-sponsored insurance schemes on a 
national scale followed two basic approaches, either subsidized voluntary insurance or 
compulsory insurance. Alber notes that three common features encouraging these 
developments were major economic depression, the organization of labour parties, and 
underdeveloped trade union funds27 (Alber 1982). 
 
Recent developments in pensions schemes have involved the encouragement of multi-
layered schemes and a move from public (backed by a pay-as-you-go scheme/PAYG and 
                                                 
25  Britain had its first compulsory insurance scheme in 1911, Italy in 1919, Austria in 1920, Ireland in 1923, Germany 
1927, Norway in 1938, Belgium in 1944, the Netherlands in 1949, France in 1967 and Switzerland in 1976. 
26  Britain introduced legislation in 1948, Denmark in 1961, Germany in 1962, the Netherlands in 1963, Belgium in 1974 
and France in 1988. Adopting features of the French Revenu minimum d’insertion (RMI)—a welfare payment designed 
to encourage social reintegration—Spain introduced MI in 1988, Portugal in 1996 and Italy in 1998. 
27  Trade unions were not enthusiastic about state provision, sensing that state participation would threaten union 
autonomy. Other issues were divisions between skilled and unskilled workers and the question of whether benefits and 
contributions should be flat-rate or not: there was often resistance to the idea that better-off workers should foot the bill 
for their higher risk colleagues. 
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Treasuries) to occupational and private pensions managed by profit-making corporations 
as well as a move from defined benefits to defined contributions.28 
 
As they have developed historically, many schemes have provided better benefits for 
public officials. The self-employed have often been in a separate system. Occupational 
pensions have been negotiated with wage agreements. Currently there is emphasis on the 
value of portability to encourage mobility of labour. With privatization, there have been 
examples of mis-selling and scandals.  
 
While the Scandinavian/social-democratic welfare states built their pension systems on 
the “encompassing security model”, which includes the provision of earnings-related 
benefits on top of a universal basic provision (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011:592), 
the Washington consensus approach to pensions has been to argue for a three-pillar 
scheme: primacy to mandatory, funded, privately managed, personal accounts or 
occupational plans funded by savings; a secondary state pension at a low level funded via 
low taxes; and a third level of voluntary personal plans.29 Overall, the direction of reform 
is towards more individualistic and unequal schemes which suit those with regular well-
paid jobs but are poor for the low waged or members of the “precariat”. 
 
With regard to income maintenance for the adult working population, health and social 
insurance and social assistance, the evidence is that universalistic systems produce the 
best outcomes. The Nordic countries are well-known for their low poverty rates and 
modest income differentials, correlating with low infant mortality and longer life 
expectancy. These outcomes are closely related to a relatively universal social insurance 
system but also to high employment rates.30 
 
Income taxes claw back social insurance payments in high-tax countries such as 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium. In the post-war period, Germany has 
continuously added new groups of previously non-covered citizens to social insurance, 
establishing what can be called a “quasi-universal” social insurance system. Due to 
relatively meagre social insurance benefits, means-tested schemes have come to play a 
more prominent role in the distributive process in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in the 
Nordic and Continental European welfare states. 
 
Health insurance is an important and often neglected aspect of social protection among 
the adult working population. When this is taken into account, the profile of a country’s 
social protection system can change substantially. For example, the role of employers in 
the health insurance market in the United States is substantial (Castaneda and Marton 
2012). Health insurance is an important component of the total compensation package 
offered to either individuals or groups.  
 
                                                 
28  The pension received would no longer be defined as a proportion of final salary or average salary, influenced by the 
number of years a person had contributed, but would be calculated in terms of the actual amount the individual had 
contributed, involving generally reduced employer or government contributions. When people are living longer and 
interest rates are low, firms stop offering final salary pensions. Protection of pensions from inflation is an issue. Many 
adults have not put aside enough to provide an adequate pension in old age. Increasing the age of retirement is 
necessary to match increased life expectancy but not all groups are equally healthy in old age and employment when 
chronically sick can be difficult.  
29  The ILO has argued for a slightly different three-tier model involving a flat-rate, means-tested, basic pension, a middle 
tier of compulsory, defined benefit funded through PAYG, and a voluntary, private tier either defined benefit or defined 
contribution. 
30  “Welfare states with the lowest universal and earnings-related benefits, as well as low utilization rates of public child 
care, and thus heavily reliant on means-tested benefits in the provision of economic resources to poor families, also 
have the highest poverty levels” (Kangas and Palme 2005:7). “Countries with market oriented family policies, largely 
reliant on targeted benefits and services to the poorest families, have the highest poverty levels, contrary to what 
proponents of selective measures would predict” (Kangas and Palme 2005:8).  
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Saltman has reviewed schemes labelled social health insurance31 and noted that up to 50 
per cent of the funds may come from public taxes or out-of-pocket expenses. While a key 
feature of such social health insurance schemes (SHIs) is the presence of statutory 
requirements, they also may involve privately owned and operated funding arrangements 
(Saltman et al. 2004). While not all citizens may be covered by such schemes, a key 
feature is that they are very popular and stable. SHIs are structured on principles of 
solidarity and collective responsibility not on actuarial principles, and they reflect and 
reinforce embedded social values. This support for civil society institutions strengthens 
intermediary layers in society and adds stability and resilience to the health system and 
more generally to society.32 
 
Recent changes in the United States with the passing of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 
may have important impacts on general health and well-being in that country, although 
difficulties in acceptance and implementation are emerging. This health care reform may 
be more accurately described as health insurance reform legislation rather than health 
care reform legislation, since it primarily focuses on increasing the rates of health 
insurance coverage (Castaneda and Morton 2012:32). Once implemented, all adults will 
be expected to have health insurance.33 
 
A strong argument has been made that with globalization, employment-based systems of 
insurance are a burden on firms’ competitiveness. Reforms are needed which, it is said, 
would shift risks from firms to the nation to assist in improving the international 
competitiveness of national enterprises.  
 
Income-tested transfer programmes range from the very narrow in the United States to 
quite broad in Australia. The key questions then may be whether these schemes are 
adequate to meet the needs of recipients, how are they targeted and on whom are they 
targeted? With retrenchment, the move is to tighten eligibility rules and reduce benefit 
levels: “the push for (downward) flexibility among the low skilled implies a hardening of 
conditions for income support to those out of work, justifying stricter eligibility, benefit 
cuts and even outright abolition of programmes” (Pierson 2001:435). Attention has to be 
paid to coverage and adequacy of schemes.34 The guarantee of a decent minimum 
standard of living for all is easier to promise than to achieve. A 2010 resolution of the 
European Parliament acknowledges MI schemes as a key instrument in combating 
                                                 
31  This social health insurance form is found in health care systems in Western Europe in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and also in Israel. Some Central and Eastern European countries 
have also adopted such schemes. Tax-funded schemes as an alternative form are found in Denmark, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
32  In a systematic review of 34 studies of national health insurance schemes in low- and middle-income countries, 
evidence on their effectiveness was inconclusive. Problems included low enrolment, but high enrolment was not 
correlated with better outcomes. Enrolment varied from 20 to 90 per cent. There is no strong evidence to support 
scaling up such programmes. The health insurance scheme must be designed to be more comprehensive in order to 
ensure that the beneficiaries attain desirable levels of health care utilization and have higher financial protections. 
Barriers to access to health care included lack of awareness and long distances to travel to facilities (Acharya et al. 
2012).  
33  In the United States today, there remains a mix of universal and selective programmes. Universal programmes such as 
the veterans’ programmes, federal employee and general retirement and disability, Medicare and Social Security (both 
for elderly people) have all continued to grow. By contrast, means tested programmes—Medicaid, food stamps, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI, for the blind, disabled or low-income people who are either 65 or older) and 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)—have borne the brunt of cuts, especially the latter two (Sachs 2011:215): “universal 
programmes make up two thirds of the mandatory spending—roughly ten per cent of GDP” and there is strong public 
support for these and little room for cuts—indeed with ageing of the population, expenditure is likely to increase (Sachs 
2011:215). 
34  In a comparison of Minimum Income schemes for persons of working age in the European Union, Figari and 
colleagues found that in several countries some individuals are ineligible for MI even when they fall below a poverty 
line set at 40 per cent of median income. And in certain countries, a large fraction of those entitled to MI remain at very 
low levels of income even when MI benefit is added (Figari et al. 2013).  A study by Nelson (2010) found that hardly 
any of 27 countries reviewed from 1990 to 2005 had moved to provide social assistance benefits above or near the EU 
near poverty threshold. Social assistance benefit levels have not converged in Europe—divergence is due to lagging 
development in Eastern and Southern Europe. 
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poverty. When it is found that some are excluded from such schemes, a question is 
whether this is due to design or failures of administration. A related question is how 
effectively do they lift people out of poverty? Figari and colleagues’ (2013) results show 
that social safety nets may be less tight than is commonly believed. Categorical 
conditions can exclude potential beneficiaries (for example, the requirement of having a 
stable residence). Some countries offer both better coverage and more adequate MI 
benefits than others, while in other countries there seems to be an implicit trade-off. 
Currently many of those losing their jobs in the recession in Europe may be ineligible for 
standard unemployment insurance or may exhaust entitlement before finding a new job. 
MI schemes seen as benefits of last resort may become the main or only social safety net 
for large numbers of people. MI benefits seem to perform better in the context of a well-
functioning labour market and strong welfare state than when they are the only game in 
town. Thus the wisdom of a general shift to means-tested benefits is questioned (Figari et 
al. 2013). They do, however, play an important role as efficient shock absorbers and have 
a counter-cyclical role—but only if coverage and adequacy are sufficient. 
 
The set of welfare reforms which abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children are 
taken as the paradigmatic policy change in the United States and influenced policies in 
other countries: “all the liberal countries have introduced significant wage subsidies 
operated through systems of taxation for at least some of the working poor—usually 
families with children” (Pierson 2001:436). In workfare schemes, the key debate is 
around the extent to which the participation of low-skilled workers in the labour market 
should be subsidized. “Make work pay” arguments involve supplementing poverty level 
wages with various forms of targeted social provision. Social assistance programmes that 
aim to fill the gap with targeted transfer payments may reinforce traditional gender roles, 
effectively replacing a portion of private transfers with public transfers but not 
fundamentally altering household dynamics (Molyneux 2006, 2008).  
 
As a contemporary form of targeting, CCTs have grown remarkably. Here cash is 
available only if people conform to certain standards and fit into set categories. Financial 
incentives and penalties aim to steer people to behave in acceptable ways, and failure to 
meet these standards is used to justify taking money away from poor people. Poverty is 
not seen as the result of inequalities but of misguided and irresponsible behaviour, 
demonstrated especially through inter-generational transmission of deviant cultural norms 
among an “underclass” (Katz 1989). This form of libertarian paternalism, informed by 
behavioural economics and variants of psychology, informs social policies in both rich 
and poor countries (Mead 1997). Workfare is intended to break habits of worklessness, 
assuming that long-term unemployment is a result of bad choices not the lack of 
permanent, secure and adequately paid jobs. Dependency is assumed to be a 
psychological and cultural condition which can be remedied only by schemes to change 
individual behaviour.  
 
Targeted schemes, while justified as streamlining and simplifying, in practice become 
complex and elaborate, and trap those relying on them. This is because, in reality, they 
operate in a complex situation where other costs, such as for housing, transport, health or 
child care, have to be factored in and vary between individuals and over time. Such 
schemes are expensive, involving high administrative costs—and largely provide profits 
for contractors and work for consultants, coordinators and trainers rather than benefit for 
claimants. Those who do not want to suffer such indignities or waste their time simply 
stop claiming and find other means to make ends meet. Research concludes that targeting 
mechanisms used by conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have been successful in 
identifying the income poor but have not fared so well in identifying households that 
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underinvest in human capital. If targeting is to be maintained, there is a need to develop 
effective multidimensional approaches (Azevedo and Robles 2013). 
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